Western Kentucky University

TopSCHOLAR®
Masters Theses & Specialist Projects

Graduate School

Spring 2016

A Soviet Parade of Horribles: Conservatism in
Glasnost-Era Discourses on Sex, 1987-1991
Svetlana Yuriyevna Ter-Grigoryan
Western Kentucky University, svetlana.ter-grigoryan604@topper.wku.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses
Part of the Cultural History Commons, Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, Film
and Media Studies Commons, and the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Ter-Grigoryan, Svetlana Yuriyevna, "A Soviet Parade of Horribles: Conservatism in Glasnost-Era Discourses on Sex, 1987-1991"
(2016). Masters Theses & Specialist Projects. Paper 1564.
http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/1564

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by TopSCHOLAR®. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses & Specialist Projects by
an authorized administrator of TopSCHOLAR®. For more information, please contact topscholar@wku.edu.

A SOVIET PARADE OF HORRIBLES: CONSERVATISM IN GLASNOST-ERA
DISCOURSES ON SEX, 1987-1991

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, Kentucky

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirement or the Degree
Master of Arts

By
Svetlana Ter-Grigoryan

May 2016

Acknowledgments
There are many people who have helped me in my research and writing
throughout the last two years, who without, this thesis would never have come to fruition.
I would first like to thank my fellow graduate students, especially Wayne and Abby, in
the History Department, who were always willing to “talk shop” and who were frequently
around to ease the academic tension with a well-timed joke. I would like to extend my
gratitude to my committee members, Dr. Dorothea Browder ad Dr. Eric Reed, for
believing in me, writing letters on my behalf, and for being easily accessible in this
lengthy and multi-step process. I would like to thank the Director of Graduate Studies in
the History Department, Dr. Beth Plummer, for her open-door policy and for providing
the subtle reminders every graduate student needs. I owe an enormous thanks to
Benjamin, who I had the pleasure of meeting at Middlbury College’s intensive summer
Russian-language program, and who introduced me to a wealth of new resources. I would
also like to extend a special thank you to my academic advisor, Dr. Marko Dumančić,
who has facilitated my transformation from student to scholar over the course of the last
two years, and who has been keenly insightful of all things intellectual and emotional.
On a personal note, I would like to thank my family and friends, who have
supported me and encouraged me to pursue my academic and professional goals,
especially my mother Marina and my best friend and fellow graduate student Chloe.
Finally, I want to extend the sincerest of thank yous to my partner, Hilary, who supported
me emotionally throughout this entire process, and who always kept me grounded in the
real world. Thank you all.

iii

Table of Contents

Abstract………………………………………………………………………………....... v
Introduction – A Soviet Parade of Horribles……………………………………………...1
Chapter 1 – Aversion Therapy: Sex as Cultural Conservatism in Cinema……………... 28
Chapter 2 – The Weakest Link: Popular Press Discourses on Sex in Soviet
Society……........................................................................................................................63
Epilogue – A Post-Soviet Paradox….................................................................................88
Bibliography………………………………….......……………………………………...98

iv

A SOVIET PARADE OF HORRIBLES: CONSERVATISM IN GLASNOST-ERA
DISCOURSES ON SEX, 1987-1991
Svetlana Ter-Grigryan

May 2016

103 Pages

Directed by: Marko Dumančić, Eric Reed, and Dorothea Browder
Department of History

Western Kentucky University

Between 1987 and 1991, Soviet filmmakers and journalists utilized Gorbachev’s
glasnost reform policy to depict or discuss sexuality in cinema and the popular press. I
argue that Soviet film and popular press discourses on sex in this period reveal a
continuity of conservative sexual mores, which were interwoven with social and moral
conservatism regarding the centerpiece of Soviet society, the Soviet family. Furthermore,
these discourses take on a fundamentally misogynistic tone, in that women are tasked
with defending sexual purity, and thus familial integrity, while simultaneously being cast
as those most susceptible to the power of sexual enticement. Thus, the comparatively
permissive discourse about sex and sexuality in the 1980s can be interpreted not as a
“sexual revolution,” but as an explosion in social and moral anxieties, that were unique to
the glasnost period, about the Soviet way of life. Additionally, this study challenges the
concept of the totalitarian Soviet system by highlighting intellectuals’ persevering
conservatism during a period where the state did not expressly govern or censor
discourses on sex and sexuality.

v

INTRODUCTION: A SOVIET PARADE OF HORRIBLES
The April 27, 1991 issue of Sovetskaia kul’tura featured a full-page article titled
“The Magic of the Forbidden Fruit,” a discussion about the recent wave of erotica,
pornography, and general “sexual permissiveness” sweeping the USSR in the late 1980s
and early 90s.1 Encased within the text is a sizable photo (Figure 1) of a topless woman
sunbathing, and a photographer who has broken off from a large group of people to
voyeuristically photograph the unaware woman. The photo represents the unique gender
and sexuality anxieties of the glasnost period to full effect. The freedom that came with
glasnost to showcase the nude form, even in a nonsexual way, is undercut here by a sense
of impending danger. The photograph suggests that the man, who has departed from a
crowd to snap photos of the sunbather, may be a predator in the making. The woman, on
the other hand, lays oblivious to her two photographers and ignorant of the sorts of
troubles her nudity may bring. Ironically, the photographer who captures the scene acts as
a secondary voyeur. The photojournalist, representing intellectuals more broadly, is given
a pass to depict nudity while he simultaneously decries its destructive power. Featuring
this photo, the journalists would argue, is for the ultimate benefit of the readers. By
characterizing sex as predatory or destructive, intellectuals behind glasnost-era
journalistic and cultural discourses utilized sex as a proxy to address social and moral
anxieties. This ostensible parade of horribles privileged intellectuals’ use of sex as
subject matter, because their productions acted as discursive proxies which addressed
perceived societal problems. Intellectuals between 1987 and 1991 embodied the
supposed social transparency of the glasnost period by shocking Soviets with a sort of
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Dalila Akivic, “Magiia zapretnogo ploda,” Sovetskaia kul’tura, April 27, 1991.
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aversion therapy. This is the paradoxical context in which discourse on sex in the
glasnost period was situated.

Figure 1. Topless woman sunbathing (photo by S. Kompaniichenko)

Increased visibility of sexuality in public discourse is frequently tied to expanded
social, moral, and cultural liberalism. Such was the case with the Sexual Revolution in
the West during the late 1960s. This connection is also made in regards to discourses on
sex in the last years of the Soviet Union, known as the perestroika and glasnost era,
referring to Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform policies. Following the premiere of Gorbachev’s
glasnost reform, political scientists and communications scholars generally regarded
glasnost as politically and culturally “liberating,” at least in the western sense of the
word.2 Political scientist Isaac J. Tarasulo, for example, argued in 1989 that sexuality in
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art and the popular press represented a foothold into moral, philosophical, and cultural
“progression” for the Soviet Union.3 The assumption that sex discourse during the
perestroika years was a sign of liberalism are bolstered when considering that the
discourses were made possible by Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost reform policy, which
softened official censorship in many facets of social and cultural expression.
Furthermore, these discourses occurred in the years leading up to Russia’s transition to
democracy. Yet examining the two most far-reaching cultural and social mediums,
cinema and the popular press, complicates the presumption of liberalism. Filmmakers and
journalists, members of the intelligentsia class, utilized the new freedoms of glasnost to
portray and discuss sex. Their use of sex as a discursive proxy, however, did not reflect
intellectuals’ increased acceptance for sexual permissiveness.
I argue that Soviet film and popular press discourses on sex in the glasnost period,
between 1987 and 1991, reveal a continuity of conservative sexual mores, which were
interwoven with Bolshevik social and moral ideology regarding the centerpiece of Soviet
society, the Soviet family. Furthermore, these discourses take on a fundamentally
misogynistic tone, in that women are tasked with defending sexual purity, and thus
familial integrity, while simultaneously being cast as those most morally and physically
susceptible to sexual perversion. In essence, the intelligentsia relegated women to the
status of “weakest link,” in that their sexuality held the most disproportionately severe
repercussions for the Soviet family and society. The Bolshevik notion of gender equality,
then, became strained and threatened to snap in this period. Thus, this study reflects the

Texas A&M University Press, 1999); Isaac J. Tarasulo, Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the
Soviet Press (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1989); Elena Androunas, Soviet Media in Transition: Structural
and Economic Alternatives (Westport: Praeger, 1993).
3
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limited potential of glasnost to liberalize the Soviet intelligentsia’s social and cultural
values, and concludes that there was a greater degree of continuity in the way
intellectuals conceptualized sex and sexuality over the course of seventy years than
ideological departure in the glasnost period. It further reveals the limits of glasnost more
generally, challenging the notion that conservatism was exclusively a top-down
phenomenon in the Soviet Union, even by the end of its existence.
Perestroika and Glasnost
In 1985, shortly after becoming the Soviet Union’s final General Secretary,
Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a speech to Communist Party activists in which he said
aloud what had been widely known for many decades: the Soviet economy had failed to
provide a “first world” standard of living for its citizens, and production output and
commerce was only getting worse. Several months later, Gorbachev introduced the
perestroika (rebuilding or restructuring) reform policies at the 27th Congress of the
Communist Party. Perestroika was designed with the Soviet Union’s long history of
economic malaise in mind. However, Gorbachev’s reforms were aimed at all facets of
Soviet society, as he recognized the problem was not purely economic, but brought about
by decades of mounting political corruption and social alienation, as well as a steady
decline of Soviet ideological and moral values.4
Gorbachev’s holistic approach to reform was buttressed by glasnost (referring to
the quality of openness or transparency), a corresponding reform policy which decreased
official censorship and allowed for freer public discourse. According to communications
scholar Elena Androunas, Gorbachev initially had a rather contrived conceptualization of
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glasnost, in that it was not meant to lead to widespread challenges of socialism or the
Soviet system, but was instead meant to be an instrument in Gorbachev’s policy of
“improving socialism.”5 Gorbachev makes this point himself in a short chapter of his
1987 book, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. The chapter,
titled “More Light to Glasnost!,” follows the trajectory of the rest of the book, in that
glasnost is limited to that which would improve the existing system without presenting
fundamental challenges. “Beware! Glasnost is aimed at strengthening our society. And
we have a lot to assert,” writes Gorbachev.6 The limitations of glasnost are paramount to
recognize the context in which discourses on sex took place.
Thus, glasnost was not envisioned as “freedom of speech” in the western sense.
Instead, Gorbachev aimed to remedy seven decades’ worth of political, economic, and
bureaucratic complacency, brought about by a lack of oversight. An alternative analysis
suggests that the Party’s control over media and mass communications was breaking
down by the late 1980s due to increased globalization and technological innovation.7 This
explanation proposes that Gorbachev was pushed into glasnost. According to media and
communications specialist Brian McNair, Gorbachev instituted glasnost largely because
he recognized that the global information revolution would bring unregulated and
questionable discourse within Soviet borders, as was the case with the spread of
unfettered information following the Chernobyl crisis.8 Thus, Gorbachev’s ultimate goal
with glasnost was to maintain a degree of control over a seemingly inevitable process.
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Alternatively, diplomatic historian Robert English suggests that Gorbachev’s penchant
for liberal reform was undercut by the need to placate Party hardliners.9 According to
English’s argument, Gorbachev was only able to make incremental changes, rather than
transform the system wholesale. In either case, perestroika and glasnost were not policies
which aimed to transform the system, a point Gorbachev reiterated several times in his
book and in public speeches. They were envisioned and designed to enhance an existing
social, moral, political, and economic system, which had been perpetuated by hardliners,
to fit the needs and challenges of globalization in the late 1980s.
The limitations of glasnost as a period of liberalization can be better understood
when juxtaposed with another purportedly liberal period in Soviet history, the
Khrushchev-era “Thaw.” Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech,” or his denouncement of
Stalinist coercion, given to the Party activists at the 20th Congress of the Communist
Party in 1956, along with his release of hundreds of thousands of Gulag prisoners
between 1953 and 1960, have cemented his place in history as a reformer. However,
historian Miriam Dobson has challenged the idea of a social and political “binary,” in
which political leaders clung exclusively to conservatism or reformism.10 Khrushchev
instituted crackdowns against crime and recidivism, and significantly complicated Gulag
returnees’ reintegration into society. Additionally, Dobson highlights the central role
ordinary citizens played in renegotiating the terms of the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, and
their resistance to accepting widespread amnesty for Gulag returnees. Similarly, citizens
in the Gorbachev period played a vital role in perestroika, and in fact, their cooperation
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was of paramount importance in the policy’s success. Both Khrushchev and Gorbachev
faced the seemingly irresolvable puzzle of trying to reform the system without
undermining the proclaimed infallibility of Bolshevik ideology. Additionally, ordinary
people in both the Khrushchev and the Gorbachev period tended toward conservatism,
independent of top-down influence. The comparison further highlights the circumspect
nature of glasnost as a reform policy, and challenges the idea of the disenfranchised
Soviet citizen. In fact, during glasnost it was Soviet citizens, filmmakers and journalists,
who resisted social liberalization.
Sexuality and Soviet Morality
Discourses on sex in the glasnost period reflect the complexity of Soviets’
problemized history of conceptualizing human sexuality, which presented Bolshevik
ideology with one of its fundamental paradoxes. On the one hand, sexual harmony was a
central principle of the socialist utopian idea. On the other hand, sexuality separate from
procreation represented, in the words of prominent Soviet sexologist Igor Kon, “the
irrational, individualistic, capricious, and spontaneous. All things anti-Bolshevik.”11
However, few members of the intelligentsia suggesting that “free love,” or the idea of
love and sex separate from the patriarchal nuclear family, was a piece of the utopian
puzzle. Ultimately, this conservatism in a period of relative journalistic and creative
freedom is a result of Soviets’ historical legacy of sexual conservatism.
Early Soviets’ ideals of “free love” stemmed from a wider nineteenth-century
philosophical trend. Late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Russian philosophers,
such as Vladimir Solov’ev (1853-1900), Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948) and Nikolai
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Fedorov (1829-1903), suggested that humans were fundamentally unique from other
animals in their ability to connect with the divine. Solov’ev contended that man existed
on three levels – natural, social, and divine – and that only when man could transcend the
procreative instinct and infuse sexuality with his divine nature, could sexuality reach its
utopian potential.12 Yet even in pre-Soviet Russia, the intelligentsia’s propensity to favor
communal society inspired unease about nonprocreative sexual relations, which were
thought to be “insufficiently communal.”13 The intelligentsia value of communal society
was emboldened by Bolshevik collective ideology, and so was the anxiety surrounding
sexual relations.
The notion that early Bolsheviks widely embraced “free love” is not entirely
accurate, and does not illustrate the complexity of how Bolsheviks conceptualized
sexuality in the 1920s. Vladimir Lenin, for example, held far more restrictive views on
sexuality than the fathers of communism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Lenin’s
primary occupation was ultimately revolution, and while he condemned religious
asceticism, he viewed energies expended on sex as distracting to the revolutionary
struggle.14 Early Bolsheviks’ ideas about sex, then, were never as liberated as were those
of their ideological forefathers’. Bolsheviks’ convoluted notions about sex and sexuality
promoted a sense of apprehension about sex and its social and cultural contexts in the
first decade of Soviet rule. According to literary scholar Eric Naiman, 1920s discourses
about sex revealed anxieties about the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which
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essentially stipulated a postponement of utopia.15 Naiman writes, “Sex may act as
symbolic shorthand for all forms of contamination feared by mentalities that produce
utopian texts.”16 Censure for NEP took on the form of sexual metaphor in Marxist
literature during the 1920s. Thereby, the glasnost-era adoption of sex as a discursive
proxy for tenuous social, political, and economic predicaments finds its roots in another
period commonly thought to be sexually progressive, the Soviet 1920s.
Examining early Bolsheviks’ problemized conceptualization of sex and sexuality
suggests that Joseph Stalin’s 1930s turn away from “free love” and toward a more
restricted, procreative model of sexuality was not so extreme an ideological deviation.
Stalin’s measures ultimately aligned with Lenin’s view of nonprocreative sex as
disruptive. Thus, measures such as the criminalization of homosexuality in 1933 and the
ban on abortion in 1936 were justified by appealing to the revolutionary logic, in that
nonprocreative sexual activity was labeled a product of capitalist decadence, and a
symptom of hedonism that was strictly anti-collectivist.17 Kon argues that official
“sexophobia” became the standard ideology in the early 1930s, as nineteenth-century
intellectuals were gradually replaced with a more conservative nomenklatura.18 However,
while sexophobia may be viewed as a retreat from Marxist “free love,” it reflects the fact
that Bolshevik leaders, and the Soviet public, were never completely comfortable with
the idea of nonreproductive sexuality.
Unlike his predecessor, Lenin, who viewed sex as merely disruptive, Stalin placed
sex and sexuality squarely within the perimeters of Soviet morality. Stalin tasked the
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Soviet school system to create a qualified curriculum of sex education that was
synonymous with moral education.19 According to this restrictive model, sexuality was
denied a discrete existence and was acknowledged only as a necessary aspect of Soviet
morality, in that procreative sex was necessary for the proliferation of a bright communist
future. Those who fornicated, then, could stand accused of anti-collectivism.
The Khrushchev-era “Thaw” mitigated some of the more extreme notions of
treason associated with nonprocreative sex during Stalinism. Officially, however,
sexuality remained restricted to the context of domestic duty. Khrushchev laid out a
moral rulebook at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party in October 1961 called the
Moral Code of the Builder of Communism. The code’s simplified twelve-point format
was a call to arms against antisocial, and more importantly, anti-collectivist behaviors.20
While the mention of sexuality was not explicitly written into the moral code’s allinclusive points, historian Deborah A. Field points out that Khrushchev’s morality drive
aimed to eliminate sex outside of marriage as a dangerous, antisocial behavior that led to
the birth of children who shared their parents’ moral weakness.21
Sexuality continued to be officially linked to morality in the 1960s and 70s. Yet,
the birth of Soviet medical sexology, called “sexopathology,” represented a progressive
step, in that the official silence around sex was finally eased. However, this “progressive”
move proved to be quite limited in scope. Kon argues that the establishment of
sexopathology was an attempt to bring sexuality under medical control without also

19
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establishing it as a pedagogical discipline.22 Thus, even medical professionals who
treated issues related to sex or sexuality received practically no training in sexuality per
se.
Because sex was circumscribed to a moral context for nearly the entirety of the
Soviet experiment, the “sexual revolution” that began in the mass media and cinema in
1987 proved to be far less radical than it at first appeared, and actually reflects a
continuity of restrictions typical of the Soviet period as a whole. Relatedly, public
discourse about sex was long associated with social and moral concerns. As Naiman
notes, erotic literature and art of the 1920s mirrored concerns about NEP and other sociopolitical changes that came with the Bolshevik Revolution. Even the evolution of medical
sexology in the 1960s and 70s did not connote a more liberalized public discourse about
sexuality. The term “sexopathology” denotes the problemized conceptualization of sex in
Stagnation-era public discourse, insofar as normative sexuality did not require public
acknowledgement.
The comparatively permissive discourse about sex and sexuality in the 1980s,
then, can be interpreted not as a “sexual revolution,” but as an explosion in social and
moral anxiety about the Soviet way of life. As Kon notes, the discourses of the glasnost
era did not entail the heralding of a “sophisticated sexual-erotic culture.”23 Even decadent
sex scenes in glasnost-era chernukha (filthy) films echoed concerns about the social and
moral status of the Soviet family in the tenuous period of perestroika. Soviet intellectuals
were ill prepared to appreciate and examine sexuality separate from a problemized moral
context. On the other hand, there was significant precedent in utilizing sex discourse as a
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proxy to proclaim social and moral anxieties in the 1920s, followed by several decades of
officially imposed sexophobic silence. Both phenomena reflect sexually conservative
ideologies, sustained in the glasnost period by filmmakers and journalists. Ironically, it
would seem, a reform movement strengthened reactionary impulses when it came to
sexuality.
Emancipating Women?
Soviet conceptualizations of gender and sexuality were inextricably linked.
Glasnost-era filmmakers’ and journalists’ discourses about sex were disproportionately
focused on women as moral bastions of the Soviet family. In this way, glasnost-era
intellectuals were following the legacy of past Soviet thinkers, who debated the limits of
women’s emancipation, and decisively concluded that it could not include a sexual
component. While the sexuality of men had been deliberated by Russian nineteenthcentury philosophers such as Vladimir Solov’ev, the Bolsheviks were the first to publicly
debate women’s sexuality. According to historian Barbara Engel, the “woman question”
of the nineteenth century, which primarily revolved around education and labor, was
augmented to embrace women’s sexuality as a public concern in the 1920s. She writes,
“In response to the increasing number of women who penetrated into public and
previously male space, women’s bodies became part of the terrain over which educated
society struggled for power.”24
Ultimately, however, women’s sexuality separate from motherhood was never
widely acknowledged, even in the 1920s. Arguably the most well-known female
revolutionary, Alexandra Kollontai, was never successful in her effort to popularize “free
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love,” and demolish the traditional family, which she argued restrained women from
achieving their capacity for self-sacrifice and self-abnegation on a revolutionary scale.25
Revolutionary posters of the 1920s represented healthy female sexuality as synonymous
with reproduction, by depicting vibrant young women surrounded by young children.26
While the 1920s were certainly the most sexually permissive period of the Soviet Union
prior to glasnost, it should be kept in mind that the comparison with the “sexophobia”
from the 1930s onward has a tendency to emphasize the emancipatory potential of the
NEP period for women’s sexuality without taking into consideration some of the
conservative realities. The lack of adherence for women’s sexual emancipation in the
1920s ultimately set the stage for Stalin-era sexually restrictive policies, which most
profoundly affected women. The Stalinist reward system for “heroine mothers,” or
women who gave birth to ten or more living children, left no room for doubt about the
social value of women’s sexuality.27
Women’s sexualities were not notably more “emancipated” in the Khrushchev
era. The full potential of the Thaw was never applied to the question of women’s
sexuality. The Khrushchev administration rushed to address the demographic crisis,
caused by the tremendous loss of male life in the Great Patriotic War, by more explicitly
connecting women’s sexuality with morality and the civic duty of childbirth.28 The
Khrushchev-era popular press, however, did temporarily suspend its unofficial restriction
on discussing sexuality in the summer of 1957, during the World Festival of Youth and
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Students, a gathering in Moscow of more than 34,000 students from 131 countries. The
criticism in the media, notably Komsomol’skaia pravda, was highly restrained, because
the Youth Festival was meant to ease tensions with the West. However, the discourse in
the popular press about sexual promiscuity provided a preview of the sort of homily that
would occur extensively in the glasnost-era press, in that the censure was focused
primarily on young women and western sexual infiltration. Journalists derided “loose
girls” (devushka legkogo povedeniia), who failed to guard their “maidenly honor” from
foreign guests.29 This rare example provides insight into the continuity between the late
1950s and the late 1980s. In both cases, women are tasked with defending sexual
morality from foreign elements. Failure to do so, then, also falls directly on their
shoulders.
Brezhnev-era stagnation further solidified the idea of women as the moral beacon
of the Soviet family. In the 1970s and early 1980s Soviet society began to more openly
acknowledge a range of social issues. However, these issues, such as alcoholism and
disenchantment with the professional realm, were thought to affect mostly men.30
According to Engel, “For these ills, femininity provided both a cause and cure.”31 That is,
women who attended to their maternal and domestic duty were viewed as aiding in
combatting the prevailing societal ills. Women whose ambitions, professional or sexual,
outstripped their prescribed roles were viewed with contempt. This is evident in the most
popular film of the stagnation period, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears (1979), where
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protagonist Katerina’s professional success in her role as an executive director at a large
factory keeps her from connecting with the love of her life, Gosha. Gosha, a talented tooland-die maker, is unwilling to compromise his masculinity by accepting a woman who
outranks him professionally. Only when Katerina is willing to abandon her professional
career in the name of love does Gosha return, with his masculinity intact. While the film
leaves inexplicit whether or not Katerina has left her position at the factory, it is her
willingness to do so in order to rise up to a traditionally feminine role that holds
significance.
Intellectuals’ discourses about sex in the glasnost era overwhelmingly revolved
around concerns for women and family, evidencing conservative continuity. In fact, it
can be argued that the perestroika era saw recognition for women as autonomous
sociopolitical actors reduced. Literary scholar Helena Goscilo argues just that in an essay
titled “Perestroika or Domostroika” (“dom” referencing “home” or the domestic space).
She notes that journalists’ coverage of women in any given context was decidedly more
misogynistic when editors were less concerned with meeting the ideological standard for
“women’s equality” during glasnost. “The majority of Russians, including those trained
in deciphering the values and political allegiances attaching to ostensibly innocuous
discourse, seemed impervious to sexist language or strategies,” writes Goscilo, “They
could not detect the articulation of gender politics in verbal formulations that any
educated Westerner would find crudely chauvinistic.”32 If women’s increased
sociopolitical autonomy is a measurement for liberalization, which it often has been, then
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misogyny in film and the popular press indicates the Soviet Union was moving in the
other direction in the glasnost years.
Ultimately, the film and popular press discourses of the transitional years rely on
an intellectual tradition of steadfastly associating women’s sexuality with reproduction
and familial (dis)harmony. The fact that the intelligentsia acknowledged women’s
sexuality separate from the maternal context, by broaching such phenomena as
prostitution and pornography, does not indicate approval. In fact, extensive coverage of
women’s sexuality corresponded with a widespread moral panic. The proliferation of
discourse acknowledging women’s nonreproductive sexualities was unsubtly linked to
pervasive moral anxiety, as both filmmakers and journalists utilized discursive proxies to
examine and explain the social ills plaguing Soviets in the last years of the USSR.
Lastly, gender anxieties in the perestroika period were also characterized by a
“crisis of masculinity,” or loss of men’s sense of masculinity as fulfilled through
professional and political pursuits. This “crisis” was first identified in 1970 by
demographer Boris Urlanis in Literaturnaia gazeta, at the beginning of the so-called
stagnation period.33 Many scholars, including Elena Zdravomyslova, Anna Temkina, and
Marina Kiblitskaya, typically ascribe men’s sense of depreciation in this period as
fundamentally linked to economic malaise, since the Soviet system defined masculinity
through success in the professional realm. However, it is important to acknowledge that
men’s sense of crisis was not exclusively tied to their professional and political prowess,
but also their societal role vis-à-vis women. According to cultural scholar Lynne
Attwood, men’s failures to be breadwinners were amplified by the relatively new role
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women had in production, as well as the home.34 In the Soviet period, men were stripped
of their hegemonic familial dominance and instructed to defer to women in the domestic
sphere. Thus, their masculinity hinged on the whim of the economy, which proved
tenuous at best in the late-Soviet period. Attwood writes, “The masculinity of men has
been damaged by the fact that many of the tasks which once fell to them have been taken
over by the state or by women.”35 This sense was amplified by women’s purported loss of
femininity in the late-Soviet period, in that they failed to have enough children to
replenish the population. For men, it seemed, women were increasingly encroaching on
their masculine territory in the late Soviet period while shirking their domestic duties.
Thus, when Gorbachev called for women to return to the domestic sphere en masse in his
sociopolitical manifesto, stating, “Women no longer have enough time to perform their
everyday duties at home,” men were emboldened with a sense of confirmation that,
indeed, women had violated their part of the social contract.36 The misogyny that seeps
out of glasnost-era journalistic and cultural discourse can then, in part, be seen as
symptomatic of a the perceived late-Soviet crisis of masculinity.
Filmmakers – Sexual Revolutionaries or Defenders of Morality?
For the majority of the Soviet Union’s history, filmmakers were considered elite
members of the creative intelligentsia. Cultural scholar George Faraday argues that the
intelligentsia, those most educated and elevated to the status of “highly cultured,” were
also implicitly tasked with upholding superior moral standards.37 In 1980, prominent
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Soviet director Eldar Ryazanov gave a speech before the Filmmakers’ Union where he
addressed the perceived moral degradation in recent cinema. Among other things, he
said, “There is only one concern – the state of the people’s soul, their health, their
stomach, their garb. And if all this does not inspire the artist, what kind of artist is he,
anyway?”38 Ryazanov’s remark was a stab at a segment of filmmakers of the stagnation
period who had taken to creating films purely for entertainment’s sake, those perceived as
abandoning their claim to the status of intellectual, and guardians of public morals.
The shared notion of moral duty was widespread amongst filmmakers, and was
bolstered by the Fifth Congress of the Filmmakers’ Union in May 1986, where a
“revolution” was set into motion.39 The 1986 cinema revolution provided glasnost-era
filmmakers with notably more autonomy, and constituted the official end to the Party’s
systematic efforts to utilize film as an ideological platform. Filmmakers utilized their
newfound freedoms to establish a new aesthetic, chernukha, literally meaning filth or dirt.
This new mode of film turned up the volume on the seamy aspects of Soviet life. These
films featured ample doses of violence, drug use, and sex, all depicted in an unsubtly gray
setting which implied moral and physical destitution. Scholars of Soviet culture and
history, however, argue that the creative intelligentsia’s moral tradition burned brighter
than ever in the glasnost period, as filmmakers utilized their new liberties to shock
audiences into recognizing social issues long censored in film. Literary scholar Seth
Graham writes, “[one argument] understood chernukha as an exercise in compensatory
excess designed to call attention to problems that were undeniably real, but hardly
terminal, beneath which lay the true ideals of the society, ideals that, after an
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uncomfortable but necessary encounter with ugliness, would reemerge to redeem that
society.”40 Cultural scholar Eliot Borenstein’s echoes this sentiment, by writing, “The
sheer negativity of perestroika-era chernukha – the deliberate épatage and the dogged
depiction of a world full of cynics – distract from the fact that chernukha functioned
within a profoundly moral context, one that was all the more powerful for not being
readily apparent.”41 In this framework, then, chernukha can be understood as echoing the
nineteen-century Russian intelligentsia tradition of intellectuals and artists as moral
arbiters.42
It is within this context of moral aversion therapy that filmmakers portrayed sex
on the silver screen in the glasnost period. Their depictions of prostitution, teen
pregnancy, abortion, or even Komsomol orgies can no more be analyzed as approbation
than their concurrent portrayals of drug use, familial abandonment, or violent crime.
According to film analyst Valeriia Gorlova, “In a normal world, sex would be seen as a
‘closed topic,’ not fit for the public exhibition. But in a world where everything is turned
on its head, as it was in the perestroika years, sex became open for public discourse.”43
Filmmakers steadfastly proclaimed that their intentions were not to exaggerate or
sensationalize Soviet ills, but to fulfill their intellectual duty of upholding morality in a
period where they were entrusted with creative autonomy. The twenty-eight-year-old
director of the most well-known chernukha feature, Little Vera (1988), reportedly stated,
“For a long time people have lived trying not to see the world around them. My film has
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angered and upset them and they ask: How could you show this? But I’m not from Mars
or America…I grew up in this system, am a product of it, a man from this country, and
these are my reflections.”44 Ultimately, there is little to no evidence to suggest that
filmmakers abandoned their sense of moral mission and adopted sensationalism in the
glasnost period. Their 1986 revolution was aimed, in part, at restoring moral integrity to
the film medium and steering away from the western notion of creating films “just
because,” or simply for entertainment.45
Furthermore, glasnost-era filmmakers’ celluloid discourses on sex are
fundamentally misogynistic, in that they implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, punish
sexually active female characters. Moreover, female sexuality frequently acts as the
catalyst to familial discord and destruction. It can be said that women’s sexual activities
in chernukha disproportionately lead to instances of death and destitution in a way that
male sexuality does not. Even in their portrayals of seemingly “sexually emancipated”
women, filmmakers insert profound anxieties about the fragile nature of the Soviet moral
and social order.
The Popular Press
The popular press was the intended and primary target of glasnost.46 Examining
newspapers and journals provides arguably the most diverse, while still admittedly
contrived, portraits of Soviet discourse in the perestroika years. According to
communications scholar Mary Dejevsky, the style and format of the popular press
changed dramatically following glasnost, and upon Gorbachev’s call to action in his
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Perestroika volume, the Soviet public was brought into the discursive fold in
“roundtable” discussions and increased numbers of editorial letters and professional
correspondent discourses.47 This new journalistic diversity was supplemented by a
relaxation in the editorial process. Tarasulo notes that, “Under glasnost, Soviet
newspapers and magazines have developed into semi-autonomous bodies.”48 This new
style, along with the dynamic sociopolitical milieu of the perestroika years, led to an
exponential rise in the circulation of daily newspapers, literary journals, and sociological
pamphlets. Papers like Izvestiia, Sovetskaia kul’tura, and Pravda all saw their circulation
skyrocket in the perestroika era. Argumenty i fakty, a relative unknown before glasnost,
gained a readership of around 23 million by 1989.49 It is fair, then, to conclude that the
popular press became a “national obsession” in the perestroika period.50
Scholars generally view the glasnost years as a unique period for the Soviet press
because of fewer official restrictions, increased readership, and the novel roundtable
format. Additionally, the popular press is seen as having very quickly supplanted
Gorbachev’s circumscribed definition of “criticism” in the months after glasnost was
made a reality. Tarasulo writes, “All attempts to define the limits of glasnost have failed.
It has taken on a momentum of its own, becoming a powerful modernizing force in an
outdated an oppressive political system.”51 Communications scholar Joseph Gibbs echoes
this sentiment, noting, “Glasnost had pushed factionalism into the open, destroying the
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monolithic image cultivated by the CPSU since the early 1920s.”52 These views reinforce
the idea of Soviet history as disjointed: before glasnost and after glasnost, and ultimately
conclude that glasnost was a disruptive policy to a hegemonic system.
Yet such a notion does not capture the complexity of the popular press during the
perestroika period. Anthropologist Aleksi Yurchak argues against the idea of the late
Soviet period as a binary, in which the elite nomenklatura ruled through coercion and the
rest of the public had little to no agency.53 Scholarship which views the popular press as
discrete from the Soviet regime, and driven by wholly separate interests, ultimately
undermines the interconnected nature of the system. “Everyone was to some extent
complicit in the system of patronage, lying, theft, hedging, and duplicity through which
the system operated.”54 Thus, it is inaccurate to cast Soviet political leaders and
journalists as diametrically opposed interest groups in the glasnost period.
Like filmmakers, journalists, overall, remained willingly loyal to social and moral
conservatism. According to Borenstein, the Soviet media followed the wave of
chernukha, in that their journalistic discourses in the glasnost period were a form of
“muckracking,” situated within a higher moral and social purpose.55 Journalists utilized
glasnost to tackle social issues they perceived in society, and yet they did so within the
context of a circumscribed, morally-driven rulebook. Discourse about sex existed in its
most prolific form in response to the wave of explicit sex in popular cinema and in
pornography. In this realm, journalists expressed nearly universal condemnation.
However, the most revealing indication that journalists remained conservative in regards
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to sex and sexuality was their widespread resistance to expand the definition of normative
sexuality away from the strictly heterosexual, marital context. Their steadfast adherence
to sexual conservatism, and their discourses on how sexual deviance could lead to
domestic, social, and economic decay, reveals continuity with the conceptualization of
sexuality in the Soviet period as a whole. The most apparent continuity is the idea that
nonreproductive sexuality had the potential to be disruptive to the revolutionary mission,
which for men included excellence in the professional and political spheres, and for
women meant mastery of the domestic and familial domains. Moreover, this continuity
presents a fundamental challenge to a binary view of Soviet history, where “the state”
enforced social and moral codes through coercion and the public meekly complied.
Overview
This thesis is ultimately a narrative about intellectuals: filmmakers and
journalists. I analyze how they approached, utilized, and portrayed sex and sexuality in
their respective mediums, cinema and the popular press, and what their discourses
ultimately tell us about the social, political, and moral concerns of the perestroika and
glasnost era. Examining their productions, which were created with comparative
autonomy in relation to the Soviet past, reveals conservative attitudes that transcend the
notion of top-down coercion, and challenges a binary view of Soviet history.
Their discourses on sexuality and morality are especially revealing because the
Russian, and then Soviet, intelligentsia was traditionally entrusted with strengthening the
moral fiber of the public, a role most intellectuals felt obliged to fulfill. Faraday
concludes about the intellectuals of the late-Soviet period, “For an educated person to
refuse to assume any kind of responsibility to society would imply forgoing his or her
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claim to the positively valorized status of intellectual.”56 Ultimately, then, the
intelligentsia was beholden to embody the highest moral values, which may or may not
have aligned with Soviet ideology at any particular time.
As an examination of discourse, this study does not seek to evaluate Soviets’
actual sexual behaviors and trends in the glasnost period. In fact, it is worth noting the
disparity between intellectuals’ discursive conservatism and Soviets’ real behaviors in
regards to sexuality in the last years of the USSR. Glasnost was a period in which the rate
of sexual violence, teen sex, and abortion increased by nearly a third.57 While the reality
of actual behavioral patterns does not necessarily align with discourse in the case of sex
in this period, the difference between ideology and practice further illustrates the
overarching theme of this study: that Soviets acted with varying degrees of sociopolitical
autonomy, whether they were reinforcing the Party line or acting against it.
Chapter 1 examines glasnost-era films of varying style and popularity, which all
fall under the chernukha aesthetic, and each feature explicit sex scenes. Chernukha was
the dominant trend in Soviet film from 1987 to the end of the USSR. It broke new ground
in that filmmakers put on display the seamy aspects of Soviet life never before expressly
depicted. Whether they were “airing dirty laundry,” or indulging in artistic excess after a
cultural draught, their onscreen discourses reflect notions that existed within filmmakers’
artistic vision, and thus reproduced a perception of life that was undeniably Soviet. I
examine nine films from the chernukha cycle, released between 1988 and 1991, of
varying target audiences and styles. The selection includes detektiv (detective), drama,
and films from the burgeoning coming-of-age genre. Likewise, I analyze films that
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topped the box office and those that received miniscule viewership. Despite the diversity
of the selection, each film was debated in the Soviet cultural press during the glasnost
period, and singled out as reflective of the wider aesthetic trend.
I argue that onscreen sex in the glasnost years existed within a misogynistic
framework which revealed a moral crisis about the state of the Soviet family, social
structure, and the domestic sphere. By portraying sex in a profoundly negative light,
filmmakers embraced conservative ideas about sex and women in chernukha to
communicate concerns distinct to the perestroika era. Their artistic “parade of horribles”
indicts women’s sexualities directly, and links them to ostensible consequences onscreen.
Thus, this chapter suggests that the sex and sexuality portrayed in this selection of films
is reflective not of filmmakers’ sense of sexual permissiveness, but of their endured
conservatism.
Chapter 2 examines the glasnost-era popular press, and the discourses on sex
which occurred within the pages of newspapers and journals. The print sources represent
the popular press broadly, and include dailies such as Pravda, Izvestiia, and Argumenty i
fakty, as well as cultural reviews like Sovetskaia kul’tura, and satirical journals like
Krokodil. These sources prove especially valuable to this analysis, as they represent
journalists as intellectuals with a moral mission and journalists as the primary targets of
Gorbachev’s glasnost policy. My examination reveals that journalist, as well as the
experts and letter-writers they featured, generally expressed conservatism about
sexuality, especially women’s sexuality. As with filmmakers, their main premise in
regards to sex was connecting sexual permissiveness with perceived degradation of social
and moral values.

25

Examining these discursive tools together adds breadth to an analysis of this kind,
allowing for a more robust understanding of both how filmmakers and journalists defined
sexuality in social and moral contexts and how they voiced their concerns. Cinema and
the popular press had a symbiotic relationship during the glasnost years. While film
frequently masked societal commentary with plot, characters, setting, or other artistic
devices, the popular press utilized film as a pretext to address moral and social concerns,
such as violence and sex.
The concluding chapter is an epilogue which briefly considers post-Soviet
discourses on sex, especially in the last ten years. While many twenty-first century
Russian journalists and cultural producers have veered away from frank depictions of
social issues, sex as a theme has grown to encompass a dominant role in contemporary
discourse. Moreover, these depictions continue to be characterized by blatant misogyny.
Contextualizing modern discourses on sex proves to be problematic, as the social,
political, and economic changes in Russia over the last quarter century have thrown
concepts of family, gender, and sexuality into disarray. In fact, it is difficult to conclude
whether journalists and cultural producers of the twenty-first century continue to
represent the intelligentsia class, or whether the class still exists. However, one
overarching concept remains intact from the Soviet to the post-Soviet period: the
expansion of visible sexuality does not necessarily correlate with a more egalitarian
society.
Ultimately, the evidence suggests that intellectuals in the glasnost period did not
see themselves as sexual revolutionaries, but as the moral vanguard of the Soviet Union.
Their discourses on sex, then, must be analyzed within this context. Although their
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prolific use of sexuality within journalistic and cultural productions initially seems
contradictory, in-depth analysis suggests that they deemed drastic circumstances were
necessary in forewarning Soviets about the consequences of an ostensibly new sexual
permissiveness. Filmmakers and journalists elected to depict or describe in graphic form
their social and moral anxieties by utilizing sex as a discursive proxy in a parade of
horribles.
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CHAPTER 1 – AVERSION THERAPY: SEX AS CULTURAL CONSERVATISM IN
CINEMA
By no means was the glasnost era a golden age for Soviet cinema. Filmmakers
were openly discussing the “death of national cinema” by 1989.58 In the late 1960s and
early 1970, the Soviet cinema industry rivaled Hollywood by producing almost 150
feature films annually. That number had withered to around a dozen domesticallyproduced full-length films in 1988 and 1989 respectively.59 The film industry was in such
an abysmal position by 1989, that there exist few reliable box office figures for the two
subsequent years. In large part, film critics attributed the decline of Soviet cinema to
filmmakers’ newly adopted permissiveness in displaying sex onscreen.60 Explicit sex was
discussed as the primary negative trend within the larger film aesthetic, chernukha
(literally meaning dark stuff), which aimed to expose the long-censored “seamy” side of
Soviet society. Indeed, the relatively few films produced in the glasnost years utilized
onscreen sex for the first time. Especially notable was the regular display of women’s
sexuality and nudity.
This chapter explores portrayals of female heterosexual sexualities in cinema and
how they related to filmmakers’ anxieties about the moral and social state of the Soviet
Union during the perestroika and glasnost period. Misogyny emerges as an essential
characteristic of a moral crisis expressed by filmmakers during the glasnost years. In their
films, fear of women’s sexual emancipation penetrates as deeply as concerns for the
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continued existence of the Soviet moral and social order. I conclude that in the final years
of the Soviet Union one of the primary characteristics of intellectuals’ (in this case
filmmakers’) moral crisis included a misogynistic framework.
Briefly examining the production of films in the glasnost years promotes a more
nuanced context in which to place filmmakers’ onscreen misogyny. This time period is
unique, and as with many phenomena in the perestroika years, the cinema industry was in
a state of flux. Misogyny, however, is a central characteristic of this period’s aesthetic in
the face of both continuities and an emerging crisis, as the subsequent analysis reflects.
Although filmmakers enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy after the 1986 cinema
“revolution,” virtually all those creating films in the glasnost period were graduates of the
oldest film school in the world, the Gerasimov Institute of Cinematography (VGIK).
They were also subject to the same rules and restrictions of Soviet filmmaking until the
fateful Fifth Congress of the Filmmakers’ Union meeting in May 1986, which began the
deconstruction of the Soviet cinema monolith.61 Thus, there is a model that most
filmmakers in the period immediately following the Union meeting still fell into, in terms
of education, production, and bureaucracy. Despite these similarities, however, the films
analyzed in this chapter were created by filmmakers from multiple generations, who
embraced various definitions of art, culture, and cinema.
It is not the mere presence of sex and nudity in glasnost-era film that suggest an
overt sexism. Instead, it is often the subtext and the nature of sex that points to this
conclusion. As Graham notes on glasnost-era film, “Sex is represented most often as
rape, though rarely acknowledged as such. Female nudity is common, and often signals
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the imminence of a rape scene.”62 Previous scholarship has aimed to contextualize the
chernukha mode in a cultural context, suggesting that chernukha was a combination of
culturally representative responses and filmmakers’ internal sentiments. Cultural scholar
Liudmilla Budiak’s analysis of the state of Soviet cinema in 1990 suggested that
filmmakers were preoccupied with basking in their new artistic freedoms by amplifying
the seamy aspects of life that had been previously censored, and that their glasnost-era
works cannot be held up as culturally representative.63 This conclusion corresponds to
what scholars have evaluated as late-Soviet filmmakers’ propensity to “create films for
themselves.”64 However, such analysis proposes that there was some degree of validity
in filmmakers’ glasnost-era social commentaries, even if they happened to be amplified
or exaggerated. They “turned up the volume,” so to speak, on the negative aspects of
Soviet living. The harshest critics of the trend commonly accused chernukha filmmakers
of inverting socialist realism, the state’s official film aesthetic that painted an idealist
picture of Soviet life.65 One of the most vocal proponents of this view was film critic
Sergei Dobrotvorskii, who denied that chernukha held any cultural capital in the
perestroika years within several issues of Iskusstvo Kino (Cinematic Art), the leading film
periodical.66
However, other scholars argue that chernukha film carried a significant degree of
cultural and moral capital in a tumultuous perestroika period. Faraday examines the
relationship between late-Soviet filmmakers’ sense of creative mission and a broader
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pattern of social consciousness characteristic of the Soviet intelligentsia, finding that
Soviet filmmakers, along with other cultural producers, felt a sense of responsibility to
uphold moral superiority.67 Rather than dissipating during the glasnost era, this prevalent
sense of purpose was bolstered by filmmakers’ renewed vigor following the “cinematic
revolution.” According to Borenstein, this turn of events imbued glasnost-era filmmakers
with renewed tenacity, and a drive to create “muckracking” films which exposed the
darker, hidden aspects of Soviet life.68 Such analyses suggest that glasnost-era
filmmakers imbued films with a sense of civic, and indeed moral, duty.
Examining a film cannot definitively answer whether filmmakers were projecting
their own misogyny or if they were reproducing their social experiences onscreen.
However, repeated instances of sexism in glasnost-era films do reveal a wider pattern in
the chernukha aesthetic, suggesting that the dominant means of expressing womanhood
or relating to women existed within a misogynistic framework. While Faraday states that,
“the key characteristic that united the works of the chernukha genre was the unrelenting
hopeless picture of life they presented,” filmmakers disproportionately held women
responsible for these deplorable circumstances.69 Misogynistic tendencies manifested
themselves through general trends in the chernukha genre. These include the portrayal of
women as incidental or secondary characters, casting women as the catalysts of familial
dysfunction, and denying female characters the opportunity for resolution or redemption
typically afforded to male characters. While these broad trends apply to the spectrum of
women and womanhood depictions in glasnost-era cinema, I single out sexuality for
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individual scrutiny. This reveals filmmakers’ fear of women’s sexual emancipation was
the foremost concern in regards to misogyny in glasnost-era cinema. Women’s sexualities
are depicted as inextricably linked to dysfunctional families, youth idleness, and moral
corruption in these films, thus suggesting that women’s sexual permissiveness was the
fundamental component of societal degradation.
The Incidental Woman Paradigm
Scholars have examined the “women as incidental/secondary figures” trope in
glasnost-era cinema. Cultural scholars Andrew Horton and Michael Brashinsky attribute
this incidentalization to the absence of a clearly delineated contemporary feminist
movement during the late-Soviet period.70 Attwood has argued that with women’s
reorientation towards the domestic sphere under Gorbachev, and a lack of a “women’s
genre of film” during the same period, there existed a propensity to marginalize women
in film.71 Most academic interpretations of women’s secondary status in glasnost-era film
rely on the explanation of external forces such as the “return to the home” trend or the
lack of a western-style feminist movement during the glasnost years. Additionally,
scholars have attributed women’s marginalization as the product of very few women
working within the film industry, itself probably a symptom of Soviet sexism. According
to literary scholar Barbara Heldt’s analysis of women in film and literature during the
glasnost period, “Women have most often been spoken and written for by men.”72 Rather
than presuming that the onscreen marginalization of women was a result of women’s
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absence in the production of glasnost-era cinema, I analyze what I term “the incidental
woman paradigm” as a product of glasnost-era filmmakers’ misogynistic framework,
most notably characterized by a fear of women’s sexual emancipation. Not only did
filmmakers portray women as merely incidental or secondary, but their utilization of this
archetype in concert with their portrayals of sexual violence bestowed a clearly
subordinate status onto women in many glasnost-era films. This analysis goes beyond
filmmakers’ “incidentalization” of women, which might be implicit in nature. Instead, the
analysis suggests an active model of filmmakers’ subordination of women, which was
unequivocally explicit. Exploring this distinction provides crucial insight into the degree
of misogyny present in glasnost-era films and cultural productions.
Pavel Lungin’s Taxi Blues (1990), a narrative that focuses around an ultramasculine, chauvinistic protagonist Ivan and his unexpected and possibly homoerotic
relationship with drunken musician Aleksi, functions as the primary example of women’s
marginalization in glasnost-era cinema. As women are relegated to secondary status in
this film, Ivan’s rare tender moments are reserved exclusively for Aleksi, an alcoholic
who initially skips out on his cab fare. Ivan’s callous treatment of women is inextricably
linked to his concern for men in terms of homosocial bonds. As a regular patron of a
prostitute named Kristina, Ivan takes her to a remote location outside the city to inquire
about the value of a saxophone he has taken from Aleksi as collateral for the cab fare.
Upon learning of the substantial value of the instrument, Ivan abandons the prostitute to
sordid gangsters as he races off to return the expensive saxophone. Ivan’s sense of honor,
in that he will not appropriate an instrument that far out-values Aleksi’s stiffed cab fare,
is far more imperative than a woman’s well-being. In fact, returning the instrument is so
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important that Ivan interrogates and physically assaults Aleksi’s estranged wife, Nina, to
ascertain the location of the hapless musician. In these two episodes, Taxi Blues not only
incidentalizes women, but unequivocally relegates them to subordinate status.
One particular incident in Lungin’s film further supports this conclusion. This
episode bonds the incidental woman paradigm to sex and sexual violence, ultimately
reflecting misogynistic tendencies that revolve around women’s sexualities. Weeks after
Ivan and Aleksi begin sharing quarters, Ivan brings home a drunken prostitute, Kristina.
He forces Aleksi to play the saxophone for them while they eat and continue to drink.
Eventually, Kristiana is drawn to Aleksi over Ivan for his talents and caresses him as he
plays. Enraged, Ivan rapes the prostitute as Aleksi exits. However, the audience is left
wondering whose affections the unhinged Ivan truly seeks, Aleksi’s or the young
woman’s. The sex turns consensual in the next scene and is only interrupted by a phone
call from Aleksi, who has been arrested for public intoxication. At this, Ivan’s attentions
immediately shift from Kristina to his alcoholic friend. The scene not only incidentializes
the sexual assault, but further marginalizes Kristina, whose relevance is suspended for the
sake of Ivan and Aleksi’s homosocial bond.
The incidental woman paradigm takes on sexually violent dimensions in several
other glasnost-era films. Sergei Snezhkin’s An Extraordinary Incident on a Regional
Scale (1988), a film focusing on a stressful week in the life of First Secretary Nikolai
Petrovich of the Leningrad Komsomol District Committee, is one such episode. After a
break-in which leaves the Komsomol headquarters vandalized and missing its regional
banner, the young, upward-bound Nikolai is slated to take the blame due to bureaucratic
absurdity. With his professional life in shambles, Nikolai takes his sense of loss and
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betrayal out on the women around him. Women are not only passive secondary figures,
but actively the targets of Nikolai’s explosive anger as he struggles to come to terms with
his lost opportunity to join the nomenklatura. At his breaking point Nikolai calls his wife,
Galia, and casually demands a divorce. They agree promptly and the phone call ends.
Nikolai then proceeds to the home of his mistress, Tania, and rapes her without
discernable provocation or explanation. Cultural scholar Vida Johnson has described the
rape as one of the most well-motivated sex scenes in glasnost-era cinema, as she
suggests, “We can observe the political and social impotence of men in a system which
has systematically stripped them of power: they do to the women what the state has been
doing to them.”73 This explanation is made all the more meaningful since the scene
features the voice of Brezhnev on the victim’s television. Nikolai’s attack on Tania may
be understood as the protagonist transferring the abuses of the state onto women. The
relationship would then function as “state-man-woman,” relegating women to an
unmistakably inferior status.74 In Attwood’s words, “Nikolai was really ‘fucking’ the
system.”75 While Snezhkin’s film certainly charges the Soviet system for the hardship
that befalls the protagonist, Nikolai abuses women in lieu of retaliating directly. This
sexual violence indicates that women are distinctly other, and unambiguously secondary,
in a system that pits man against an abusive Soviet state.
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The 1989 film Assuage My Sorrow, directed by Victor Prokhorov and Alexander
Alexandrov, offers another portrait of broken masculinity and pits women as the target of
masculine rage. The film centers around a disintegrating young family, focusing on
husband and father Boris. Due to the USSR’s chronic housing shortage, Boris is forced to
continue living with wife Liuba, even as both parties desperately want a divorce. The
living arrangement often dissolves into vicious verbal and physical entanglements and the
lines between married couple and singledom are hopelessly blurred. Both husband and
wife become involved with new partners in the midst of the messy separation. However,
Boris’s reactions to Liuba’s sexual explorations reveal a double-standard between
husband and wife. When Boris encounters an intoxicated Liuba returning from a night of
drinking and flirting, he accosts her at the metro station. Boris calls her a pig and
physically assaults her in public. Although Liuba is drunk, she reasons, “We are in the
midst of a divorce. Why do you think you can tell me what to do?” In response, Boris
grabs her roughly and sexually molests her in plain view of pedestrians, ripping off her
clothes. A passerby asks if everything is alright, and Boris confidently offers, “Yes, she is
my wife.” The scene is meaningful in several ways. First, it clearly showcases
inequalities between men and women. While Boris feels entitled to drink and flirt, Liuba
is not afforded such liberties. Second, Boris’s sexual attack on Liuba and his
proclamation of “She is my wife” further evidences his sense of entitlement. The
bystander’s acceptance of this explanation reveals that the sentiment is not only confined
to Boris, but is shared by other, reasonable and concerned men in society. Above all else,
the initially concerned passerby’s acknowledgement of Boris’s privilege to discipline his
wife demonstrates the sexually violent character of the incidental woman paradigm. After
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the sexual assault, Liuba follows behind Boris as he walks home, swaying and sobbing.
She is unsubtly disgraced, as Boris struts tall and unaffected at the forefront. While his
emotions are dissected throughout the film, Liuba’s state of mind about the divorce and
the attempted rape remain quite two-dimensional.
While Snezhkin’s and Prokhorov’s features cast women as incidental and
secondary figures in a conjugal sense, Savva Kulish’s Tragedy Rock-Style (1989)
marginalizes the influence of women in the life of teenage track-star-turned-drug-addict
Viktor (Vitia). Although the film features several female characters, the major figures in
Vitia’s life remain male. When his father, a respectable member of the nomenklatura, is
arrested in connection to mafia activity, the previously well-adjusted teenager falls
instantly into despair. Vitia consequently latches onto the disreputable Cassius, whose
calculated plan to extort Vitia’s father hinges on pushing Vitia into complete heroin
addiction. Meanwhile, the women in Vitia’s life, who express a profound concern for his
wellbeing, are pushed to the sidelines by the disaffected teenager. The primary incidental
figure is Vitia’s girlfriend Lena. She is deeply infatuated with Vitia, and occupies herself
with daydreaming about the two of them locked in a passionate embrace. When Vitia
struggles to cope after his father’s arrest, Lena refuses to leave his side, even as he
derides her and pushes her away. Eventually, Lena abandons her promising future to
follow Vitia into heroin addiction. While Vitia seeks escapism to cope with his father’s
ordeal, Lena follows Vitia into the dark and depraved underground subculture for no
discernibly authentic reason. Her character functions as an appendage to Vitia, and it is
not until the two become hooked on drugs that Vitia gains the silence he initially craves
from Lena. Unlike the women in An Extraordinary Incident and Assuage My Sorrow,
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Lena is given a degree of autonomy as she actively pursues her love interest into a dark
abyss. However, the motives are not her own and the plot is only moved by Vitia’s
emotions and actions.
Lena is also marginalized in a fundamentally sexual manner, similar to the
women in the abovementioned films. During Cassius’s regularly sponsored drug-fueled
orgies, Cassius singles out Lena as his personal victim, raping her countless times
throughout the film. Unlike the rapes in Taxi Blues and An Extraordinary Incident, we
are not numb to Lena’s palpable suffering after her assaults. We see Lena cry, scream,
vomit, squirm, and shake in the aftermath of her rape. Yet even here Lena’s anguish is
not her own, as each scene splices with a visual of Vitia’s parallel and comparatively
stoic suffering. In her physical distress, Lena acts as an auxiliary force to Vitia’s
emotional turmoil.76 The incidental woman paradigm in this film, as within the
aforementioned, manifests itself most fundamentally when concerning women’s
sexualities.
Victor Sergeev’s detective film, The Assassin (1990), provides a unique
perspective on the “incidental woman paradigm” because the protagonist is, indeed, a
woman. Yet this film typifies glasnost-era filmmakers’ tendency to cast female characters
as peripheral even as they act as primary protagonists. Sergeev’s film stars Ol’ga, a welloff young professional, who returns from a party after being gang-raped by four men.
Ignoring official channels of justice and the concern of her friends, Ol’ga chooses to seek
vengeance by hiring a mafia-connected hitman to exact revenge. Initially infused with a
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large degree of sexual and emotional autonomy, Ol’ga acts thoroughly unaffected by her
assault and instead plots to humiliate her assailants. We are even given the impression
that the rape has bolstered Ol’ga’s sexuality as she prances about her apartment in loose
fitting blouses that threaten to blow away in the wind. However, the scale of power tips
decidedly against Ol’ga when her hired mercenaries go rogue, gang-raping one of the
men’s teenager daughters as a form of revenge. Although horrified by the punishment,
Ol’ga stays resolute and even phones the remaining assailants to inform them of their
impending fate. When the youngest of her assailants, Andrei, shows up to reason with
Ol’ga, she quickly falls in love with him in an unlikely turn of events. Ol’ga’s power is
then inverted as she fails to call off the mercenaries she hires. Her position shifts from
controlling the situation to becoming another victim on the run. Attwood has likened the
course of events in The Assassin to Hollywood’s film noir of the 1940s, where female
characters who challenge male authority are killed or “neutralized” by their romantic
union with a male hero.77 This case is particularly severe, as Ol’ga is joined to her former
rapist. Even as Ol’ga serves as the film’s primary protagonist, her reckoning is effectively
neutralized by what filmmakers dub a more appropriate feminine pursuit, love.
Women were subject to the incidental woman paradigm in many Soviet films, in
which males drove the narratives and which utilized female characters as little more than
animate setting pieces. When it comes to sexual violence in Taxi Blues, An
Extraordinary Incident, Assuage My Sorrow, Tragedy Rock-Style, and The Assassin,
however, women are not only secondary figures in a male-focused world, but clearly
subordinate ones. Subordination, as channeled through sexual violence in these films,
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shifted how women were portrayed from a model of passive disregard to one of active
disdain. This mutation signified that, at least in film, women were at the bottom level of
the “state-man-woman” hierarchy.
Kto vinovat’?: Women’s Sexuality as a Catalyst for Familial Ruin
Because women were considered the traditional bearers of Soviet familial virtue
and stability, it is not surprising that much of glasnost-era filmmakers’ moral crisis
existed around the idea of women as the catalysts of familial ruin. According to Goscilo,
“From time immemorial, the dominant Russian iconography has projected nationhood as
female, its ethos and moral identity metaphorized as maternity.”78 While the Motherland
(rodina-mat’) paradigm offers a maternal image of nationhood which characterizes
patriotism and national pride as a celebration of the feminine, so, too, does it fault women
and womanhood when the inevitable question of “Who is to blame?” (Kto vinovat’?)
arises. In her analysis of this seemingly double-edged archetype, Attwood concludes,
“We had repeated examples of female characters being used throughout Soviet history to
represent Mother Russia and the heights of morality. Now, it seems they are being
offered as symbols of the Soviet state and its distorted values.”79 Female characters’
sexualities, then, act as catalysts to familial ruin in glasnost-era film in two ways. First, a
daughter’s misguided orientation toward carnal desire destabilizes her
parents/grandparents and siblings. Second, a mother’s inappropriate or unchecked
sexuality breaks apart a family either physically or symbolically. While scholars have
analyzed the misogynistic, paradoxical implications of the feminine national identity
trope, I further highlight an antipathy to women’s sexualities within it.
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A daughter’s misguided focus on sexuality spelling destruction for her family can
be observed in a new genre of film in glasnost aimed at youth. These films, firmly
situated within the larger chernukha phenomenon, fed on the cultural media’s burgeoning
fascination with young people’s entanglement with hippy, punk, biker, and criminal
themes.80 Vasili Pichul’s Little Vera (1988), a film about a disenchanted and rebellious
eighteen-year-old girl wasting away a summer in a provincial city, proved to be the
flagship feature of this sub-genre and indeed glasnost-era film more broadly, drawing
over fifty million viewers.81 Pichul, a twenty-eight year-old first-time filmmaker, also
proved that a new model of Soviet film, one based on independent cooperatives that
existed by the grace of their investors, could produce critically acclaimed and financially
successful features, a new concept for Soviet cinema.82
The film encapsulates the chernukha aesthetic with its drab, dreary depiction of
youth and its sardonic title which literary means “little faith” (nothing is lost in the
translation). Vera spends her days with a motley crew of youths, most involved in some
sort of illegal activity. The characters in Little Vera fall into apathy, idleness, and
immorality because of a fundamental lack of opportunity in society. The teenage
wasteland in Little Vera is defined by drunkenness, hooliganism, and especially sex.
Teens in the film are cast as losers (neudachniki), and their hedonistic behavior comes at
the cost of the collective well-being, their families in particular. Vera, who is portrayed as
a sensual being, fully invested in earthly pleasures, is a fatally flawed character. Her
sexual transgressions eventually lead to the downfall of her family. Her improvised
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marriage to a local bad-boy, Sergei, is motivated by Vera’s naïve hope of escaping
prescribed Soviet dullness. However, Vera gets more than she bargained for when
tensions between Sergei and her father boil over, leading to a vicious assault on Sergei
and her father’s untimely death due to a heart attack. Vera’s sin in this film, then, is
pursuing personal pleasure instead of her family’s wellbeing, primarily by focusing on
sex. This is a point that is made ironically, as Vera jumps into marriage (a traditionally
appropriate female pursuit) and even pretends to be pregnant for no discernable reason.
Vera’s seeming mockery of Soviet domestic life leads to a rupture in her strained family.
The undisputed runner-up in terms of box office success during the glasnost era
was Pyotr Todorovsky’s film adaptation (1989) of Vladimir Kunin’s novella Intergirl,
with forty-one million tickets sold.83 The film, following a Leningrad twenty-three-yearold nurse by-day and prostitute by-night found widespread success because it featured the
first cultural portrayal of prostitution in the USSR, a topic already extensively dissected
by journalists. Apart from her moonlighting, the protagonist Tania appears to be the ideal
of femininity. Physically, she is traditionally attractive and stylish. Intellectually and
emotionally, Tania also proves to be an ideal Soviet woman as she dedicates herself to
her patients and her mother. She also reads romantic Russian poetry in her free time.
Tania’s exemplary qualities, however, cannot compensate for her deviant sexual activity.
Like Vera, Tania’s mistake lies in her erroneous assumption that she can utilize her
sexuality to control her circumstances, a mistake for which she pays dearly. In Intergirl,
Tania’s deviant sexuality provokes familial destruction in a very literal sense. Her mother
ultimately commits suicide after rumors of her daughter’s illicit transgressions reach her.
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The disapproval of female sexuality in both Little Vera and Intergirl stem from
filmmakers’ sense of crisis about the deterioration of the Soviet family. In both cases, the
heroines’ sexualities go beyond the prescribed bounds of marriage and reproduction, thus
rupturing their families and eliminating the possibility of a morally-sound future
generation.
Additionally, filmmakers tasked mothers with the ultimate moral weight in
glasnost-era film, utilizing the Motherland (rodina-mat’) paradigm. This folkloric view of
women and motherhood was emboldened, however, by the Soviet state’s pragmatism. In
the 1930s, the state concluded that it could not realistically rear children in a truly
collectivist fashion, and essentially affirmed an uneasy compromise with mothers.
According to sociologist Ol’ga Issoupova, “The emerging politics [in the 1930s] of
motherhood was seen as a state function, for which women should be rewarded. Second,
in line with this, the state was concerned with the quality of future generations. This
implied women’s bodies were valuable vessels in which the state had a legitimate
interest.”84 In return, women were given ultimate authority in the domestic realm. This is
evidenced by the Soviet system’s deconstruction of paternal power and its vitalization of
the “heroine mother” iconography.85 This arrangement was bolstered by Gorbachev’s
vow to liberate women from their double burden of professional and domestic obligation,
allowing them to retreat to the domestic domain to address a demographic crisis.86 The
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net result of these measures was the thorough construction of women as maternal beings,
and consequently, the imbuing of mothers with the moral responsibility of the country.
Glasnost filmmakers’ moral crisis, then, was reasonably expressed through troubled
motherhood imagery. Thus, women’s sexualities, particularly if those women were
mothers, were of great concern for filmmakers during glasnost.
Kulish’s chernukha film Tragedy Rock-Style is one such example where a
mother’s sexuality is seen as the major destabilizing force for her children. Star student
and athlete Vitia’s decline into drug-fueled depravity is pinned, in no small part, on his
absentee mother, who calls him occasionally. He sardonically refers to her as his
“telephone mother,” and sees images of her nurturing him as a small child as he slips into
a psychedelic state. Despite his father’s mafia affiliation, and Cassius’s calculated effort
to hook Vitia on drugs, the truant mother acts as the reservoir of blame, the true source of
Vitia’s inability to cope. Although the details are deliberately murky, we are left to
believe that Vitia’s mother left the family to pursue a lover.
Assuage My Sorrow is sustained almost completely by the destructive mother
archetype. The film, a grim tale about a couple in the midst of a messy divorce, is more
fundamentally about a hopelessly broken morality system. For all intents and purposes,
the wife and mother, Liuba, is held responsible for tearing the family apart. Liuba spends
her days priming in the mirror in preparation to meet new suitors, a symbol of her vanity
and general indifference to domestic duties. Her young son, Zhora, wanders about the
apartment complex with seeming free reign. He engages seedy characters and holds his
own. We are given the distinct impression that Zhora is headed toward a sordid path, in
great part because of his mother’s disinterest in raising him. Notably, this disinterest
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stems from her preoccupation on her own sexuality. On one occasion, Boris rebukes
Liuba when she reveals she has no idea where young Zhora might be. Her tone is
thoroughly unconcerned and her gaze never shifts from the mirror in which she prepares
for another night out with a suitor.
Liuba’s disinterest in motherhood becomes unsubtly more active as the film
proceeds. When Boris’s plan to move out fails because of the housing shortage, Boris
tries one final time to resuscitate the marriage. He prepares a romantic dinner and even
puts on cologne. Boris and Liuba initially enjoy each other’s company, having sex and
reminiscing about better times. However, when Boris asks her for one final chance, Liuba
is thoroughly uninterested. Her refusal is not only a denial of romantic ties, but of her
familial and moral obligations. At this juncture, Liuba’s impassive attitude regarding her
maternal duties is replaced with a more definite renouncement. Liuba’s rejection sends
Boris into a seeming tailspin, and he begins acting carelessly in all aspects of life, even
raping a young traveler to whom he initially offers lodging for a night.
One film amalgamates both the maternal and filial destruction mode by utilizing a
multi-generational approach. Unique from other glasnost-era films which offer women’s
sexualities as catalysts to familial destruction, Viacheslav Krishtofovich’s theaterinspired Adam’s Rib (1990) associates women with stagnation rather than wholesale
destruction. The film, which focuses on three generations of women who share an
apartment in an unnamed provincial city, seemingly suggests that women are doomed to
repeat a lonesome existence from one generation to the next.87 The film defies its title,
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which automatically conjures the image of women as secondary to men (i.e. Eve being
created from Adam’s Rib), and turns the tables by introducing men as merely transient
forces in women’s lives (i.e. fathers and husbands). However, Adam’s Rib remains within
a misogynistic framework which holds women’s sexualities responsible as the source of
stagnation. Goscilo has argued that glasnost-era films that invert the incidental woman
trope do so in a way that offers a stagnated picture of female-driven life, one that does not
hold the same level of intellectual complexity as male-driven narratives.
“One might reasonably object that these works, rather than offering a
fresh perspective, actually perpetuate the dusty habit of equating women
with body, reproduction, domesticity, and conservative attitudes. Indeed,
to some extent they do. Moreover, in troping history along gendered lines,
they implicitly supply to the imperishable question, ‘Who is to Blame’
[Kto vinovat’?] an ominous answer that attributed moral responsibility to
Russian womanhood.”88
The moral responsibility for stagnation in Adam’s Rib is not only communicated
through women’s physicality, but primarily via their sexuality. This moral charge rests
mostly with the middle-aged single mother, Nina, and her daughters, Lidiia and Nastia.
Throughout the film, Nina is caught in a whirlwind between two ex-husbands and a
potential lover. Sensing that her time to attract a suitor is limited, and bent on avoiding
growing old and alone as her mother has, Nina organizes a party (ironically for her
mother’s name day) and invites all three men in a last-ditch effort to secure one.
However, Nina’s bombastic attempt to provoke love hinges on the remnants of her sexual
appeal, which degrade with each passing day. Ultimately, Nina’s hare-brained scheme
collapses and all three men leave. She is pushed by her waning sexual appeal to sabotage
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her prospects, once again faced with the likelihood of solitude. Not unsympathetically,
filmmakers cast Nina as predestined for loneliness because of an insincerity which stems
from feminine sexuality.
Nina’s daughters do not fare much better. Lidiia, a twenty-something
professional, becomes involved with her married boss, Andrei, who promises to whisk
her away for a holiday abroad. However, Lidiia’s vision of romance abroad dissolve
when she learns from Andrei’s wife that he has taken another lover on Lidiia’s promised
jaunt. She also sees the result of her infidelity in the suffering of another woman,
Andrei’s wife, who struggles to reign in her energetic children while begging Lidiia for
information. The woman’s amplified loneliness shocks Lidiia, whose misguided hope for
love rested on an unsound foundation of lust.
Lidiia’s fifteen-year-old sister Nastia’s sexuality, however, ultimately ensures the
family of women is fated to repeat its current dilemma. The young girl is impregnated by
a naïve boyfriend, Misha. While certainly ill-equipped, Misha displays a genuine desire
to be with Nastia and to help raise their child. He shows up on Nastia’s doorstep no less
than three times, turned away without explanation repeatedly. The film ends with
Nastia’s pregnancy announcement, followed by a seeming miracle as the bedridden
grandmother joins the family and begins singing. While this finale is inconclusive, the
men have fled and we are left to assume that it is women who are to bring about a new
generation, although a stagnated one. It seems that for a third generation, the women have
failed to close the circle of family with permanent fathers and husbands. Given this
repeated pattern, we can safely assume Nastia’s child will be a girl, likely to perpetuate
the shattered domestic edifice.
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When it comes to moral crisis about family, these films indicate that women are
largely to blame. In Little Vera and Intergirl, a daughter’s misguided utilization of sex for
adventure and material gain respectively bring about the downfall of the parents, who
have failed to propagate a morally sound progeny. Assuage My Sorrow and Tragedy
Rock-Style suggest that a mother’s inappropriate focus on sex impedes her ability to
concentrate on domestic and familial duties. Moreover, the films imply that sex
deteriorates a woman’s sense of maternal instinct, a more profound denunciation. Finally,
these motifs are amalgamated within the image of a pregnant, fifteen-year-old Nastia in
Adam’s Rib, whose female relatives provide a vivid reminder or women’s emotional and
romantic destitution when sex is misused. The generational struggle in this film suggest
that the crisis regarding mothers and daughters is ultimately one and the same.
No Rest or Redemption for the Wicked
Arguably the ultimate feature of glasnost-era filmmakers’ constructed
misogynistic framework is a double standard in regards to redemption and second
chances, afforded to women at a nominal rate in comparison to their male counterparts.
Sexually liberated female characters are rarely endowed with the chance for resolution or
reformation, and more often met with a death sentence. While this can be said to be a
general trend in chernukha, women’s “death sentences” are typically punishment for
sexual transgressions. Chernukha suggests that both men and women have been haplessly
tormented and deformed by the system. Yet, the blame for moral degradation falls on
women, who corrupt morality with sexuality. Similarly inspired as the aforementioned
model, filmmakers of the glasnost period equate women with familial and moral
responsibility, while freeing men of these same obligations. Drawing on a literary
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tradition of the Silver Age, even the most contrite female characters must be neutralized
if plagued with sexuality.89 As women are continuously denied a chance for redemption,
this trend acts as the dominant misogynistic mode in glasnost-era film, ensuring
punishment for female sexuality even after the film’s conclusion.
A lack of redemption for sexually conscious women is most prevalent in Intergirl,
a film which utilizes the “hooker with a heart of gold” archetype to full effect.90
According to Goscilo, Tania’s seeming Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde duality syndrome is a
symbol of Russia’s own troubled transitional process in the perestroika years: her
penchant for high culture poetry and her affection for animals starkly contrasts to her
economically motivated sexual services.91 The moral crisis in Intergirl stems from an
uncertainty about importing capitalism during perestroika, and for Soviet filmmakers,
prostitution optimizes the corrupting power of capitalism at every level. We witness
Tania’s selfless actions on multiple occasions. She is silhouetted by the sun’s bright rays
whenever she tenderly treats her patients, highlighting her altruistic nature and relating
her to godliness itself. Even after she successfully emigrates from the Soviet Union,
material plenty soon loses its luster and Tania becomes deeply concerned about the
family and friends she left behind. Yet even as Tania throws away her luxurious western
lifestyle to literally race back across the border, redemption is denied to her as she
crashes in a foreign car at the literal and metaphorical border between Russia and the
west.
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At the same time, we witness numerous second chances afforded to men in
Todorovsky’s film. In her quest to leave the country, Tania must procure the official
consent of her estranged father. Surprised and concerned by the bureaucratic delay, Tania
nevertheless seeks out her biological father, who she finds living with a new family on
government assistance. Seemingly no less besmirched by capitalistic incentive than
Tania, her father refuses to give consent unless Tania provides him a sizable ransom. Her
father’s cupidity pushes Tania into one last act of prostitution, a profession she swears off
after Edward’s proposal. Tania’s father is a repugnant image for Soviet viewers, as he
willingly trades his daughter’s virtue for rubles. Likewise, his embodiment of the
absconding father trope and his willingness to live on welfare in lieu of a profession
epitomizes the perestroika period’s “crisis of masculinity.” Yet his second incarnation
with a new family and the eventual pay off from his daughter constitutes a second chance
not afforded to Tania herself. The dichotomy suggests that Tania’s sexual sins surpass
even the most abhorrent male transgressions.
Tania’s death demonstrates arguably the most powerful example of women’s
inability to find redemption in the chernukha film mode. Escaping from the capitalist
“prison” that is Edward’s Swedish villa, Tania speeds back across the Swedish-Soviet
border as she senses something gravely wrong. Simultaneously, Tania’s mother discovers
her daughter’s past and commits suicide by inhaling fumes from her oven. Death by
kitchen appliance holds a highly symbolic role for Tania’s mother, who has lived and
died by the domestic standard, and whose only sin is rearing a morally corrupt offspring.
In that moment, Tania spins out of control and dies in an automobile collision. Utilizing
Goscilo’s analysis of “time forward” and “time back,” which collapses generations of
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women into a paradoxically timeless stasis in the “present,” we can assess that Tania and
her mother are inextricably linked as one.92 Inexplicably, Tania senses her mother’s
impending death and dies herself. This conclusion also suggests that moral culpability for
deviant sexuality rests not only in the female perpetrator, but with previous generations of
women.
Other glasnost-era films with female protagonists offer similar circumstances
where a likeable heroine is ultimately given the death sentence for her sexuality while her
male co-star is awarded a second chance. Sergeev’s noir-inspired The Assassin provides
one such example. Ol’ga’s love affair with Andrei seems like an infraction against
literary dogma, unless we are to understand rape as a minor offense. According to
Attwood, “Andrei’s part in the supposed sexual abuse is seen as nothing more than a
male prank, a mere sexual misdemeanor.”93 Although both characters die, Andrei’s death
is ultimately shouldered by Ol’ga, whose dissolute quest for vengeance has cost him his
life at the hands of the very rogues she hires. Her own death, a suicide by shotgun, is only
initiated by her lover’s demise. In the ultimate film noir conclusion, Ol’ga’s sexual
autonomy is so profoundly neutralized that her death automatically follows Andrei’s.
Andrei is exculpated by Ol’ga’s forgiveness, yet Ol’ga receives no such leniency for
attempting to redeem her violated sexuality.
This trend is further observable in Abay Karpykov’s tawdry feature Blown Kiss
(1990), a film about an 18-year-old nurse’s (Nastia) sexual awakening after her fiancé’s
refusal to consummate the relationship before marriage. Nastia engages in a steamy
sexual affair with a mysterious, bandaged race car driver under her care. She also learns
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to utilize her sexuality to get what she wants from the males around her, including a
childhood friend who works nearby as a gardener. When Nastia’s surgeon fiancé, Sergei,
discovers the two locked in a kiss, he confronts Nastia. He admits his abstinence is
motivated by a rape he committed in his past. Seemingly unfazed, Nastia proclaims it was
Sergei’s lack of interest that drove her into the arms of other men. The film ends with the
two reconciling and speeding off on Sergei’s motorcycle. However, they crash and Nastia
dies due to Sergei’s recklessness. Because of Sergei’s past history of sexual violence, he
chooses abstinence to prevent repeating the act on his fiancé. Nastia, on the other hand, is
unable to control her sexual desire for even a moment. Unlike Nastia’s repeated instances
of sexual immorality, Sergei’s sexual restraint is held up as morally exemplary. Only
when Nastia finally persuades Sergei into sexual activity does he speed out of control on
his motorcycle and crashes.94 Miraculously, it is Sergei who survives the high-speed
impact, while the sexual seductress, Nastia, receives the death sentence.
Once the question of “who is to blame” is answered, the rules of literature would
demand a fitting punishment. Sexually emancipated women in glasnost film are faulted
for the weakening of the Soviet family, which ultimately leads to the vulnerability of
future Soviet generations. In turn, women are deprived of redemption or second chances
when they seek them in Little Vera, Intergirl, The Assassin, and Blown Kiss. These films
suggest that the appropriate punishment for sex outside the marital-procreative context is
death. However, this standard is applied primarily to women, whilst men are given either
an exemption or a second chance in these films. This trend indicates that filmmakers held
substantially more trepidation about women’s sexual liberation than men’s.
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“Becoming Men Again,” But at the Expense of Women?
Examining women as incidental figures, women as architects of familial
destruction, and women as irredeemable sinners showcases a pattern of misogyny in
glasnost-era film. However, a more robust analysis of the late-Soviet “crisis of
masculinity” provides a degree of affective motive for consistently grim portrayals of
women in the chernukha aesthetic. As expressed by writer and literary critic Viktor
Erofeev in his 1999 book, Muzhchiny (Men),
“Late Soviet liberal discourse in both academia and society saw men as
biologically, psychologically, and demographically weaker than women –
engaging in risky behaviors that indicated a ‘crisis of masculinity’ because
of their inability to perform their traditional roles as family breadwinners.
That was then, this is now. The Russian guy is getting up off all fours. It is
time for him to become a man.”95
Erofeev was neither the first nor the last to recognize a “crisis of masculinity” in the late
Soviet period. Soviet demographer Boris Urlanis launched the ongoing discussion in an
article published in a 1970 edition of Literaturnaia gazeta.96 The notion that it was
indeed time for the Soviet muzhik (sneaky male) to “become a man” (stat’ chelovekom)
was widespread in late-Soviet literature, and is recognizable in cinema as well. Thus,
analyzing an expressed antipathy to women’s sexual emancipation in glasnost-era film
illustrates a fuller picture of the degree and nature of misogyny in these films.
Whereas women felt the wrath of disgruntled men in chernukha, the power
dynamics between men and women were ultimately defined and intertwined with the
state, which figured prominently in gender relations. A rudimentary explanation of the
power quotient between the Soviet state and the Soviet man equates the state to the
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“Motherland,” and thus the state’s gender is unambiguously female.97 Consequently, the
affective punishment exacted on women in chernukha cinema can be interpreted as
symbolic denouncement of the Soviet state and system. However, an alternative
explanation considers the social consequences of power balance between the Soviet state,
men, and women, and suggests that the Soviet state’s measures to “embolden” women
bred men’s sense of resentment towards women.98 According to cultural scholars Elena
Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina, there were several reasons why men could have
reasonably fostered negative associations toward women. These reasons include the fact
that men were the demographic minority and had a life span of ten years less on average
than women.99 Additionally, men felt a mounting pressure to succeed professionally from
both the state and their families even while the country’s economic predicament steadily
worsened in the late 1980s. This occurred while women were given a supposed reprieve
by Gorbachev to retreat to the home.100 Thus, anger towards women under the
abovementioned conditions cannot be completely explained as an allegorical response to
a system that fostered unachievable standards of masculinity. While the state may be
blamed for perceivably disenfranchising men, the films’ depictions of sexism must be
considered as addressing women themselves, separate from the state. Whether women
actually benefitted from the state’s social engineering is less relevant here than how men
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may have perceived women’s privilege. Therefore, the misogynistic framework in these
films extends beyond the state and indicts women.
Much of the male ire around women’s sexualities in glasnost-era cinema is
associated with the domestic sphere, and men’s own inability to actively control their
collapsing private lives. The trend of disenfranchising fathers began almost immediately
following the Revolution, and the Law Codes of 1926 essentially deprived fatherhood of
its economic and legislative base.101 Examining men’s strained roles as fathers and
husbands, specifically in cases where men endeavor to fulfill these roles in spite of
stacked odds, demonstrates the level to which male immorality and dysfunction relies on
women in glasnost-era cinema. Examples of this phenomenon are observable in Assuage
My Sorrow and Tragedy Rock-Style, films in which fathers and husbands try and fail to
realize these proscribed roles. Filmmakers may not have intentionally aimed to scapegoat
women as the sole cause of men’s failed familial ventures, and indeed the films’
substance often indict the Soviet system for restricting men’s ability to reasonably
function in a domestic capacity. However, women’s primary function as bearers of moral
virtue exists disproportionately with their otherwise secondary roles in both films. In
these depictions, the crisis of masculinity stems not only from the system’s dysfunctional
and corrupt nature, but also from the shortcomings of women in a domestic sphere
(usually because of sexual distractions). Thus, glasnost-era films that aim to put on
display the system’s emasculation of men also charge women, to whom the system grants
absolute authority in the domestic sphere.102
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This is evident in Assuage My Sorrow, as the film’s bleak setting and Boris’s
inability to physically vacate the apartment are mostly products of the Soviet system. The
feature was delayed by the artistic council of the company which created it, Mosfil’m,
which argued Prokhorov’s and Alexandrov’s film portrayed a Soviet reality that was “too
gloomy” and would probably be blocked for its subversion of ideology by the Conflict
Commission.103 Yet the Conflict Commission, in an unusual turn of events, rejected the
ruling of its lesser organ and allowed the film to be screened unchanged. This may have
been because the primary indictments for the “gloomy” setting are the mother and wife
models, not of the Soviet system directly. Any doubts about whom Boris blames for his
broken family are resolved in the aftermath of his failed reconciliation attempt with exwife Liuba, when he takes out his frustrations on another young woman. The vagrant
El’ia, who Boris houses for a night, stands in as the embodiment of failed Soviet
motherhood in the absence of Boris’s ex-wife.104 She is literally without a meaningful
anchor, as she wanders without a home. El’ia escapes the domestic sphere, seeking an
abortion early in the film. Boris equates her with his failed marriage when she prances
around naked, “trying to get comfortable.” Boris replies to El’ia’s nude liberties with,
“Comfortable? All you dogs [emphasis added] have become far too comfortable.” The
subsequent rape of the young woman, who has gotten far too “comfortable” outside a
prescribed domestic standard, evidences who the filmmakers authentically find guilty.
Boris’s lack of dignity and his subsequent loss of control are certainly not
exclusively his ex-wife’s fault. Yet Boris’s chronic malaise at being forced to live with
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his ex-wife, who persistently pursues other men in his presence, is deeply troubling. He
struggles to keep hold of whatever “compensatory masculinity” he can by beating and
raping women.105 Boris views women as imbued with the task of keeping domestic
harmony and the resources to do so, and yet women ostensibly ignore their obligations by
insisting on divorce or aborting their children. Unable to remedy the familial trouble
himself, Boris abuses women. The state, the force which ultimately prevents Boris from
moving away and starting anew, is never expressly charged in the film. While we can
reasonably assume that Boris’s attack on his wife and El’ia are allegory for his disdain
for the state, his pronouncement that “all you dogs have become far too comfortable”
suggests his animosity is primarily aimed at the sexually emancipated women he
encounters.
Alternatively, Tragedy Rock-Style initially presents the uncommon scenario of a
healthy, single-father home.106 However, the tranquility is decimated by an immoral and
emasculating system, encapsulated within a corrupt legal system riddled with mafia
connections. According to Horton and Brashinsky, the film “is the father-son narrative
that embodies the contemporary [glasnost-era] Soviet crisis.”107 Vitia’s posthumously
recorded reflection, that “children brought up on lies cannot be moral,” is unequivocally
directed at the Soviet system. However, Kulish’s fumbles in his attempt to conclusively
cast the system as nefarious and unjust, and the male mafiosi villains come across as
clunky, generic, and two-dimensional figures. Instead, Vitia’s strained relationship with
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his “telephone mother” appears definitively more formative for the teen. This also holds
true when considering whom Vitia blames for his desperate situation, the mafia or his
mother. Evidence that he casts his mother as guilty is present when Vitia enters his
altered, psychedelic state and envisions idyllic beach-side walks with his mother during
his childhood. Vitia’s mother proves to be the last image he sees even before he dies.
Such flashbacks featuring Vitia’s father, the parent we are led to believe primarily
raises the teen, are curiously missing. “Even when the father was physically present,”
writes Kon about late-Soviet domestic spaces, “his influence and authority in the family
and his role in bringing up the children were usually considerably less than that of the
mother.”108 Even in Vitia’s rather extreme case, where his mother is completely absent
and his father is an exemplary parent, the culpability for Vitia’s suffering rests with his
mother, just by her physical absence, as much as with the Soviet state.109 She does not
make an onscreen appearance until after Vitia’s death. It is not until after her arrival that
she is informed of what transpired and collapses into tears. While the mafiosi go
unpunished in this film, we are left with the brutal image of a mother grieving her child.
Depictions of men failing to dominant in the domestic sphere, and indictments
against women for moral deterioration, can be found in almost every era of Soviet film
and literature. The trend of disenfranchising patriarchal institutions was rooted in
Marxism from the beginning.110 Yet the crisis of masculinity in the perestroika era
expanded beyond the familial realm and existed as a discrete sort of anxiety of the
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perestroika years. According to cultural scholar Brian Baer, the Soviet system
deconstructed male-male homosocial bonds and systematically minimized a space for
platonic male friendships, which could be viewed as a brotherhood separate from the
Soviet collective.111 Additionally, the perestroika period witnessed the importation of a
variety of western products and ideas for the first time, including the previously
forbidden topic of homosexuality.112 Thus, men in the perestroika years had the
additional challenge of reclaiming homosocial bonds with the taboo threat of
homosexuality supposedly undermining the process. In some ways, homosexuality
embodied an ostensible western ideological onslaught. Thus in glasnost-era film, and
even more so in the post-Soviet 1990s, the dominant means by which men relate to one
another becomes via “compensatory masculinity,” where hyper-macho linguistic and
bodily expressions preclude the possibility of being labeled a homosexual or not
sufficiently masculine.113 Yet this male homosocial crisis can be interpreted as
characteristically misogynistic. As Baer notes, in these chauvinistic depictions of
masculinity, “women almost always function as a means of exchange between two rival
males.”114
In this respect, Ivan in Taxi Blues is a deeply troubling glasnost-era figure. While
certainly the embodiment of compensatory masculinity, in that he can regularly be found
brawling or working out, his longing to establish a homosocial bond with musician
Aleksi result in an unwinnable situation for the cab driver. While the Jewish, well-
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dressed, and often emotional Aleksi clearly lacks either hegemonic Soviet masculinity or
perestroika-era compensatory masculinity, Ivan vows to help him “become a man.” There
are several instances in the film that may suggest that Ivan implicitly desires Aleksi
sexually, a sign that Ivan’s makeshift masculinity is poorly equipped to nurture a healthy
homosocial bond with the troubled Aleksi. According to cultural scholars Denis Ioffe and
Frederick White,
“The homosocial relationship in Taxi Blues is framed within a structured
institutional relationship that mandates certain roles for men and women,
boundaries that Aleksi and Ivan cannot so easily transgress, thereby
demanding that Kristina [the prostitute] become the agent for the two men
to consummate their relationship.”115
This can be observed in the scene where Aleksi plays the saxophone for Ivan and
Kristina, and ultimately entices her attention. The bisecting of Kristina as a sexual object
between Ivan and Aleksi sublimates a deeper, subconscious sexual attraction the two men
have for each other, which has been bred through the suppression of Soviet platonic male
friendship. Notably, this depiction of masculinity in crisis utilizes a woman as an
essentially inanimate intermediary between two males, suggesting that even a “strictly
male” crisis could still be utilized for misogynistic effect in glasnost-era film.
The notion that it was time for the Soviet man to retake the mantle of dominant
masculinity was widespread in the perestroika and glasnost years. While economic and
political deterioration had endangered the ideal of masculinity engineered by the state,
men’s aggression toward women in films like Tragedy Rock-Style, Assuage My Sorrow,
and Taxi Blues cannot be fully understood as allegorical indictments against the state.
Instead, the sexual violence against women, or sexual dominance to be more precise,
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should be interpreted as symptomatic of men’s inability to view women as equals and
their sense of powerlessness in the domestic sphere.
Conclusion
During the Silver Age of Russian literature, women’s sexual consciousness was
represented as a socially threatening phenomenon.116 A similar tradition was adopted in
early Bolshevik literature. As Borenstein states, “In the years prior to and following the
revolution of 1917, the image of Mother Russia as either the helpless victim of rape or
the wanton whore selling herself to the highest bidder could be found across the
spectrum.”117 Analyzing women’s sexualities within glasnost-era filmmakers’ broader
misogynistic tropes suggests this trend is not limited to Imperial Russia or the
Revolutionary period, and can indeed be applied to the glasnost era as well.
Filmmakers were permitted to repurpose the Silver Age double-edged sword of
Russian womanhood in chernukha film thanks to the new freedoms of glasnost. While
analyzing their portrayals of women’s sexualities does not provide conclusive evidence
of filmmaker’s sexism, it can reveal common anxieties expressed by filmmakers with
diverse cultural and social philosophies and agendas. The duality of Fin-de-Siècle
Russian womanhood, mother and whore, mirrors filmmakers own glasnost-era concerns
about women as both the most morally vital and morally susceptible in Soviet society.
Thus, the sex in glasnost-era films cannot be seen as decidedly liberating for women.
Instead, it represents a continuation of a fairly conservative social and moral Russian
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cultural tradition: defending women’s sexual virtue from a predatory outside world which
seeks to destroy it, and the family bedrock with it.
This continuity is complicated, however, by unique circumstances of the
perestroika period. Women’s sexualities come into crisis as they encounter circumstances
that are uniquely “glasnost,” such as foreign-currency prostitution and youth culture.
Thus, filmmakers utilize a misogynistic framework to express age-old concerns as well as
anxieties about their contemporary dynamic and uncertain cultural, social, and political
milieu.
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CHAPTER 2 – THE WEAKEST LINK: POPULAR PRESS DISCOURSES ON SEX IN
SOVIET SOCIETY
Sex as a topic was opened to public scrutiny in Soviet newspapers and journals
during glasnost. Like with film of the same period, the presence of sex in the popular
press hardly indicates a fundamental shift in how sex was conceptualized in the Soviet
Union. Journalistic discourses do not suggest that intellectuals’ attitudes about sex, nor
sexuality, became markedly more permissive. In fact, the dominant trend in the glasnost
print media was the continuation of previously restrictive principles regarding sexuality.
Nonetheless, sex and sexuality did become new discursive proxies in this period,
revealing social and moral anxieties about family and society.
The news media’s apprehensions were grounded in fears about the supposedly
dissolving state of morality and the family in the perestroika period. Perestroika brought
with it economic, political, and social instability, and thus led to higher instances of
crime, family breakups, and destitution in general. Journalists regularly suggested that
sex was the root cause of these social ills, and their preparedness to make this connection
reflected profound unease about reforms affecting perestroika-era Soviet society.
Moreover, press discourses about sex’s potentially destructive force disproportionately
singled out women as both the most vulnerable victims of a new sexual permissiveness,
and those who could most profoundly damage society with their sexual transgressions. In
essence, then, women are described as the weakest link, whose sexual compromise could
be most disastrous to Soviet society.
Journalists’ discourse about sex in the transitional years reflect the liberties and
limitations of glasnost more generally. According to Dejevsky, Gorbachev’s primary

63

intent with the glasnost reforms was not endorsement of “freedom of speech” in the
western sense.118 Instead he aimed to achieve a goal of more limited proportions. Before
1985, the Soviet people widely looked to newspaper publications for the “official” party
line, and with only minor discrepancies in the coverage and details of news events.119
However, newspapers continued to serve as the single most effective method to distribute
ideas to a mass segment of the public. According to Androunas, Gorbachev’s glasnost
was primarily targeted at the print press, who envisioned limited critiques of policies in
order to improve aspects of the socialist system that had been degraded by lack of
review.120 “Glasnost was allowed as an instrument of Gorbachev’s policy of ‘improving
socialism’,” writes Androunas, “and a weapon of his struggle against orthodox
Communists and the party nomenklatura.”121 Thus, the scope of glasnost was meant to be
fairly limited, intended to improve the system without advocating any fundamental
challenges.
Soviet journalists focused on social problems, such as alcoholism, orphans, and
homelessness because there was considerably less “red tape,” or state-enforced
restrictions, in pursuing these narratives than in reporting on political developments.122
Reporting on the Afghan War, party corruption, or expressing “heretical ideas about
market economics,” remained treacherous territory for journalists, who could still not hint
at the system’s fundamental inadequacies.123 Thus, discourse on social issues, notably
sex, became increasingly common in the glasnost years.
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The nature of sex discourse in the popular press evolved within this distinctly
glasnost context. Journalists’ reportage of sex relied on a circumscribed, morally-driven
rulebook. Thereby, the new availability of sex as a discursive proxy did automatically
connote more liberal attitudes about sex and sexuality. Instead, popular press discourses
suggest that conservative perspectives about sex and sexuality prevailed in the last years
of the Soviet Union.
No (Wo)Man’s Land: Between Erotica to Pornography
The difference between “erotica,” or artistic depictions of sex or sexuality meant
to evoke an aesthetic or emotional response, and “pornography,” or visual imagery of sex
that are primarily meant to satiate sexual desire, were contested in the media in the
glasnost period. “There must be a way to get away from asexual cinema without falling
into dirt and vulgarity,” writes Krokodil film correspondent Pytr Smirnov in 1989,
“However, we have yet to discover that way, and films like Little Vera, which depict
young girls involved in sexual affairs, pardon my language, are simply pure bestiality.” 124
Smirnov’s comment reflects the media’s disinclination to differentiate between “erotica”
and “pornography,” and indicates a reluctance to establish, in the words of sexologist
Igor Kon, a “sophisticated sexual-erotic culture.”125 Furthermore, such declarations
demonstrate a continued loyalty to the idea of sex as a procreative necessity. The press
displayed a widespread refusal to acknowledge a difference between sensuality and
sexuality in the glasnost period. Their expressed hesitations rested upon the perceived
negative effects sexual imagery could have on women and families. Thus, even within a
time period where the state did not actively prevent the development of an erotic culture,
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journalists argued against such a phenomenon because they ruled that the stability of the
social and moral order outweighed the need for erotic culture. In essence, the established
sexual conservatism triumphed over sexual liberalism in the print media.
The primary means by which the popular press expressed unwillingness to
acknowledge erotica lies in discussions of sex in glasnost-era popular cinema versus
pornography. The difference between sex and nudity in cinema and the burgeoning
pornography industry was largely lost on popular press correspondents. Explicit sex
scenes in popular cinema are described as precursors to full-on pornography. Journalists
and film critics exclaimed that sexually “perverted” filmmakers aimed to intentionally
undermine Soviet morality by normalizing explicit depictions of sex in cinema.
One could argue that a sociopolitical system that circumscribed sex to the role of
procreative necessity, as the Soviet civilization largely had, would be hard-pressed to
observe a difference between erotica and pornography once suddenly given the freedom
to do so. However, chalking up the press’s resistance to erotic culture to growing pains
does not adequately reflect the complexity of journalists’ social and moral concerns
during this period. Most notably, the denunciation of erotic culture was expressed largely
through journalists’ discourses on women’s loss of wholesomeness and virtue in both
popular film and pornography. As Graham observes, “The polemics surrounding
chernukha largely mirrored the major sociopolitical debates regarding perestroika itself:
how much critical exposé is too much? What symbols and ideals, if any, should remain
‘untouchable’?”126 One of these “untouchable” ideas proved to be the concept of
women’s sexual purity. The popular press claimed to defend women from explicit
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displays of sexuality in both popular cinema and pornography. A Pravda correspondent
laments on this seemingly downhill battle, writing about how pornography sales had
spiked over a two year period.127 The November 1990 article states,
“I see these ‘dead eyed’ girls, pictured nude on these magazine covers sold
at metro kiosks…Surely this is not the life they envisioned for themselves.
Do they not long for the conventions of the old world – love, family, a
home? They have convinced themselves that the highest privilege is to
appear in Playboy or to become a Hollywood ‘star,’ when really these
western conventions are toxic for society and family. These are the new
lessons taught to us by the heroines of Little Vera and Intergirl, and
further perpetuated by pornography. What we need now is not erotica or
pornography, as Dr. Igor Kon would suggest, but support for our Soviet
families.”128
This blurb typifies the popular press’s categorical resistance to screened sex in any form.
Their opposition was united by a moral crisis that was female-oriented, and focused
principally on the threat posed to women in their prescribed roles as morality bearers and
heads of family.
Discourses about sex in glasnost film and pornography were united by a
discussion of potential repercussions that applied solely to girls and women. Journalists
argued that sex in cinema and pornography place girls and women into real danger. This
disproportionate anxiety about women’s safety and moral virtue indicate journalist and
film critics were concerned about how sexual imagery adversely impacted women’s
ability to focus on family and the domestic space.
Journalists’ apprehension applied primarily to young women, characterizing them
as the most vulnerable targets of “erotic propaganda.”129 A letter featured in a March
1989 issue of Sovetskaia kul’tura, signed by nine teachers and doctors of the “older
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generation,” expresses concern for the state of teenagers’ morality and concludes that,
“The screen is mostly to blame.”130 However, references to “teenagers” more often refer
to teenage girls than to boys. The jointly-written letter laments, “At the age of 11, young
girls and boys are already engaging in sexualized games, and by age 14, girls are lining
up for their first abortions.”131 Even though both teen boys and girls are reportedly
affected by screened sex, the mention of repercussions exclusively references young
girls, who are impregnated and seek abortions.
Moreover, journalists’ sense of anxiety about derailing girls’ and young women’s
path to domesticity is expressed similarly in discourse about both film and explicit
pornography. Two quotes, about popular cinema and about pornography respectively,
exemplify this trend. “Films like Little Vera and An Extraordinary Incident aim to
dissuade young people from the natural life path, which is love, marriage, and family, and
wish to convince them that their selfish goals are more important,” writes a Pravda
correspondent in November 1989.132 A Sovetskaia kul’tura article from the same year
suggests that, “Pornography has the greatest effect on adolescents ages 13-14, whose
perception of what is valuable in life – love, marriage, and family – becomes
fundamentally warped by sexual imagery.”133 The fact that these two statements are
nearly interchangeable highlights journalists’ lack of differentiation between erotica and
pornography. The primary force that prevented this distinction is an overarching concern
for women as domestic bastions, defending mainstays such as “love, marriage, and
family.”
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The print media’s consolidation of erotica and pornography under the umbrella of
one destructive, anti-social phenomenon was not implicit. Instead, journalists, film
critics, and other cultural commentators acknowledged the possibility of erotic culture in
the glasnost era, and then actively vetoed it. Their explicit denouncement suggests a more
active standard of conservatism than the comparatively passive model associated with the
inability to decipher art from obscenity. Their arguments centered on the idea that the
Soviet public was not prepared for, or “could not handle erotic culture.”134 Such
expressions reflected journalists’ hesitations about a lack of censorship or regulation in
portrayals of nudity and sex. However, they ultimately argued that the need for morallyupright Soviet families overshadowed whatever cultural openness or educational
opportunity erotica could offer. Their public debates about the pros and cons of erotic
culture indicate that journalists actively deciphered the nuanced difference between
artistic sensuality and carnal desire. And yet, their acknowledgement did not translate
into approval.
According to cultural commentators, erotica had a similar effect on the Soviet
population as pornography and incited violence against women. Analyses that suggest
that erotica was just as harmful as pornography hint at journalists’ profound sense of
anxiety about women and the Soviet family, who are deemed extraordinarily fragile in
this period. An article published in Sovetskaia kul’tura in April 1991 discusses the
USSR’s December 1990 commission on regulating obscenities.
“We must recognize the dangers these obscene images pose to our
population, and take all measures to block them…As for erotica:
unfortunately, this is not the time for erotica to flourish. We must first
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focus on stabilizing our society and only then can we think about the
possibility of erotic culture.”135
The correspondent’s focus on timing suggests anxieties about erotica were not wholly
interchangeable with those of pornography. Instead, journalists expressed concerns that
were specific to the unstable conditions of the perestroika years. They concluded that the
public was experiencing a particularly vulnerable moment, and that protecting moral
virtue was of principal importance. The commentator disclaims that, “These sort of
regulations can border on absurdity, as they did in the old days,” suggesting that the
commission’s proposed solution was recognized as an extreme measure, and yet a
necessary one in a period of particular fragility.136
According to historian Paul Goldschmidt, the division between “high” and “low”
culture in Russia was always more extreme than in the west in any given period.137 Yet,
resistance to establishing an erotic culture in the glasnost era reflects unique anxieties in
the glasnost era. According to Kon, an erotic culture did begin to take shape during
perestroika.138 Novels that contained eroticism, such as Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita and
James Joyce’s Ulysses, were published in their unabridged forms from 1985 onward.
Artists held exhibitions of erotic paintings, books, and photography for the first time
since the 1920s. At the same time, however, pornography which depicted all manner of
sadistic sexual activity was recorded and distributed around the country. Occurring
simultaneously was a nearly twenty-five percent increase in rape and sexual assault
between 1988 and 1989, as well as increased instances of familial abandonment, teen
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pregnancy, abortion, and prostitution.139 The print media suggested a direct link between
pornography and the abovementioned social statistics. Given these circumstances, they
were largely unwilling to consider erotica separate from pornography. It would be better,
they argued, “to snuff out the cult of
violence and sex at its root.”140 Figure
2, a comic from a 1990 issue of
Krokodil, encapsulates journalistic
fears about exposing the public to
erotica.141 It emphasizes the Soviet
public’s inability to appreciate erotic
art during the perestroika years and
underscores the undesirable traits
sensuality may inspire. In declining to
differentiate between erotic art and
pornography, the popular press
Figure 2. This cartoon emphasizes the Soviet
public’s inability to appreciate erotic art during
the perestroika years. Krokodil, December 1990.

exhibited an steadfast loyalty to sexually
conservative principles. They also

implicitly revealed startlingly low faith in the common Soviet citizen.
A Legacy of Misogyny: Reporting on Prostitution
Discourse about prostitution in the USSR proved to be misogynistic, as it almost
always cast female prostitutes as the source of the growing epidemic. Additionally, the
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popular press suggested that the solution to combatting prostitution began and ended with
reforming prostitutes, and did not consider the “johns.” Thus, the media’s call to battle
prostitution on “economic, moral, legal, and ideological fronts,” can be interpreted as
exclusively targeting women.142 Ultimately, the focus on women aligns with the popular
press’s conservatively-based moral crisis about women as the foundation of Soviet
family, and the need to protect their sexual virtue.
Discourses on prostitution during glasnost were just as novel as discourses on sex
itself. Often viewed as an infiltrating mechanism of the west, sex was frequently
dissected in a critical manner. The added burden of sex-for-pay solidified skeptics’
denouncements of the taboo topic. The early Bolsheviks declared victory over
prostitution in the 1920s. For them, it symbolized the most malignant form of capitalism:
selling the female body to the highest bidder. Furthermore, Bolsheviks quickly did away
with the notion of “free love,” assigning non-marital sex the status of idle distraction at
best and anti-revolutionary menace at worst. Prostitution was anathema to multiple facets
of Bolshevik ideology. Thus, the print media’s discussion of prostitution was not limited
to the context of sex, but extended to encompass poverty, crime, social justice, and
womanhood. By the 1980s, many journalists acknowledged that the “war against
prostitution,” was in fact, far from won. Although most did not seek to prove that
prostitution had existed all along (thus undermining the regime), they provided
conclusive evidence that at the very least, there had been a “resurgence” of the
“vanquished” social ill.
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This burgeoning reportage, however, was almost exclusively one-sided, focusing
on the female prostitutes and ignoring the pimps and “johns” altogether. Glasnost-era
journalists’ tendency to emphasize female prostitutes and overlook male patrons does not
conclusively evidence sexism. However, the tone and nature of the media’s fascination
with the seamy world of sex-for-pay was paradoxical, highlighting the need for social
reform at the beginning of an article and castigating prostitutes as nefarious and
materialistically motivated by the end. “Society must fight the factors that cause
prostitution,” wrote a Pravda correspondent in 1989, “but not prostitutes themselves.”143
This statement, made in the conclusion of the report, conflicts with the correspondent’s
evaluation that, “Prostitution is melting away the virtue of young girls…It is young girls
tempted by wealth who are at the greatest risk of becoming entrenched in this deviant
subculture.”144 The correspondent’s relatively mild contradiction is augmented by other,
more severe assessments. As the topic gained media attention, Chief Director for
Combating Organized Crime and Corruption Ministry of Internal Affairs Aleksandr
Gurov embarked on a media tour to quell concerns. His interviews in Sovetskaia kul’tura
and Argumenty i fakty both began by identifying prostitution as a “disgraceful
phenomenon of capitalist society, one which aims to sell the bodies of women.”145 Yet
Gurov further assessed prostitution to be a fundamentally selfish endeavor on the side of
women, who he identified as turning to the practice not out of economic need, but
because of an “unwillingness to work.”146 Additionally, Deputy Gurov dismissed
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accusations of a “moral dilemma” surrounding the practice of prostitution, and inferred
that the issue was strictly economic. “Right now we have a mass problem, as in western
countries,” concluded Gurov, “But is this a question about the exploitation of women?
Nothing of the sort!”147 Notably, statements about the male patrons that kept this
underground industry lucrative were omitted from Gurov’s assessment.
Media ambivalence on the issue is most strongly evident in journalists’ interviews
with, or exclusive profiles of, sex workers. These reports channel a fascination with the
practice and lives of prostitutes. Naturally, these pieces disproportionately hinged on the
phenomenon of foreign-currency prostitution, brought to the limelight by the film
Intergirl (1989). Journalists simultaneously ignored the vast majority of the underground
industry, where destitute women exchanged sex in dingy pay-by-the-hour hotels or
railway stations for a few rubles.148 A Krokodil correspondent’s 1987 profile of a highend prostitute who tricked on the streets of Sochi under the alias Laura provides an
example of how the media’s fixation on prostitution predated Intergirl. The article is one
of the few to acknowledge johns in the world of prostitution, but within a context that
places the blame exclusively on the female practitioners. “I felt dirty the whole time I was
covering the story, and then I began to have negative [sexual] thoughts about every
young woman I saw on the street.”149 This correspondent’s conclusion, then, suggests
that women were wholly responsible for prostitution rather than responding to the
demands of a male-driven market. Thus, the media’s call to battle prostitution can be
interpreted as a call exclusively made against immoral women.
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News media fascination with prostitution in the glasnost years was a phenomenon
unique to the milieu of the perestroika period and represented a profound duality in
regards to sex and women. It was purportedly the embodiment of capitalistic excess, and
yet, multiple surveys suggest that one-third of high school girls freely admitted that they
would exchange sex for currency in a sample size of one thousand.150 Another survey
revealed that over half of Soviet women viewed sex work as a “feasible” career option in
a sample size of over two thousand.151 Prostitution was also not so far removed from the
misogyny of the film industry, and to a much greater extent, pornography. According to
Goscilo, the film and popular press industries had normalized “the exploitation of
women’s bodies as marketable commodities and objects of displaced male violence.”
Prostitution proved to be on the extreme end of the spectrum, and yet a natural extension
of the sort of sexual exploitation seen in glasnost-era cultural media. Ultimately,
prostitution represented the culmination of Soviet paradoxes about women and sexuality.
On the one hand, prostitution was entertained as a legitimate career option for women
because it empowered them to gain a degree of economic autonomy. On the other hand,
prostitutions’ normalization in everyday thought and in popular cinema elicited the print
media’s expressed concern about moral wholesomeness in the perestroika years.
Another theme that arises within prostitution reportage that is distinctly
“perestroika” is the “capitalist nature” of this social ill, along with a sense of crisis about
western ideology’s infiltration during an uncertain perestroika and demokratizatsiia
(democratization) endeavor. Since the media’s attention was disproportionately focused
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on high-end prostitutes who catered to foreign, western clients, prostitution and
prostitutes became symbolic of capitalism and material excess within the print media.
Historian Elizabeth Waters concludes that, “The prostitute became established as a
symbol of the ‘golden world’ of dubious pleasures and unearned income, with a
permanent place in the rogues’ gallery of ‘unlaboring’ types whose economic and
ideological sins were, allegedly, responsible for the country’s present plight.”152 Thus
there was a sense of panic in these pieces that western men were infiltrating the USSR
and stealing the virtue of its women, or more precisely, those who were charged with
leading the Soviet Union into a bright, morally wholesome future. In his interview with
the high-end prostitute “Laura,” correspondent V. Vitalev from Krokodil asked, “Would
you marry one of your western clients and emigrate?”153 Laura’s answer that she would
not hesitate, echoed a profound trepidation about the future of the Soviet Union and
western elements infiltrating the country, and worst of all, absconding with its women,
and thus, Soviet virtue. This anxiety would draw over 40 million Soviet viewers to
theaters two years later to see Todorovsky’s Intergirl, a film that gave artistic form to this
palpable moral panic. Reflecting the double-sided coin of Russian national identity, one
part maternal nurturer, one part whore, journalists’ sense of metaphorical panic was
amplified when western clients were thrown into the mix of prostitution.154
The reportage on prostitution amplified the character of the glasnost era.
Journalists’ implications that prostitution had been eliminated up to perestroika and their
disproportionate coverage of foreign currency prostitution reveals their anxieties about
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west-inspired reforms. Additionally, the press’s undivided attention on women within
prostitution, both as criminals and as victims, reflects a world in which women’s sexual
transgressions were judged on a far harsher scale than their male counterparts. Their
suggestions that prostitutes choose their profession primarily to escape familial obligation
and to pursue material comfort exposes a profound concern about the social and moral
state of the Soviet people.
The Threatening Force of Youth Culture
Popular press discourse positioned itself against sex in burgeoning youth cultural
movements. According to cultural scholar Hilary Pilkington, perestroika and glasnost
helped to reorient the public’s attention away from the private sphere and onto a novel
and fascinating public sphere, because reform policies focused on “bringing operations
out into the open.”155 Paradoxically, it would seem, this reconfiguration increased
expressed anxieties about the private sphere in the print media. A new focus on the public
over the private brought about a blossoming of “youth culture,” where teens built peer
networks around rock-n-roll, biker, and hippy subcultures, networks that existed separate
from state-sanctioned youth communities such as the Komsomol. Thus, rock-n-roll, punk,
biker, street, and hippy subcultures were widely considered deviant youth activity by
journalists in the glasnost press. Moreover, girls and women were publically viewed as
the objects of young men’s sexual desire within these youth movements. Journalists
observed that girls within youth cultural activity were vulnerable, misguided, and
attention-starved. As with the aforementioned phenomena, journalists referred to young
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women as both the most at-risk within youth culture, and themselves potentially the most
sexually deviant perpetrators.
The film Tragedy Rock-Style captured the public’s fear about “the cult of sex”
surrounding rock music by literally combining the reportedly destructive forces of youth
culture with cultism, painting a distinctly negative picture of punk music and youth
“escapism.”156 The popular press etched a similarly dark depiction of youth culture, one
that viewed girls as those most vulnerable to the ill effects of youth culture and also those
most susceptible to falling into hedonistic behaviors. A December 1990 profile of punk
culture in Sovetskaia kul’tura denounced the entire scene, highlighting young women.
“The girls that go to the punk concerts, they show up with their pimpled faces and their
sagging breasts (wearing no bras), and they will do anything to gain the attention of the
band or any other male who will take notice. They stand around, with their short skirts
and their ridiculous black eye makeup, just begging for it.”157 The correspondent
concluded by stating, “We must save our kids from rock-n-roll and the sex industry.”158
Yet signals within the article suggested that the focus is preserving young girls’ virtue.
Additionally, teens’ hedonistic behaviors proved to be a widespread concern, as questions
about rock-n-roll “deviance” arose in casual interviews. An interview with the USSR’s
popular thrash metal band Corrosion of Metal in December 1990 brough up such
questions, and the correspondent asked group leader Sergei Troitsky about Satanism,
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drugs, and sexual excess in “rock-n-roll.”159 Troitsky’s flippantly acknowledgment of
these phenomena further presents readers with a sense of youths’ reckless hedonism.
Furthermore, the activities of young people were said by many journalists to
reflect the problems of the wider Soviet public, as one correspondent argued in an article
titled “The Youth is a Mirror of Society.”160 Another correspondent noted that although
people ages 13-24 comprise the largest segment of Soviet society, the membership of the
Komsomol had shrank considerably while crime statistics continued to skyrocket.161 The
popular press expressed anxieties about a large youth population that was steadily losing
its interest in socialist values.
In covering young people’s movement away from the status quo, newspapers
focused primarily on sexually active teenage girls. Newspapers provided alarming
statistics about teen pregnancy and abortion. Focusing on pregnancy and abortion in
regards to teen sex assured that the discourse would be centered on young women. In
November 1989, Argumenty i fakty presented a study of worldwide abortion rates which
ran in TIME magazine and suggested that the USSR had the highest level of abortion by
more than two times, with 181 per 1000 women between the ages of 15 and 44 receiving
an abortion each year.162 Moreover, the correspondent does not dispute the figures, which
came from the west and ordinarily would be questioned.
Journalists further condemned what they viewed as the ultimate consequence of
deviant youth sexual activity, teen motherhood. Motherhood was viewed as the
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culmination to Soviet love and marriage, the means by which the Soviet future was
ensured, and so its compromise appeared especially urgent. The press pointed to the
widespread orphan problem as the ultimate consequence to youth sexual activity. A
November 1987 report stated that 300 thousand children live in orphanages and 700
thousand orphans were in guardianships.163 The correspondent noted that the delegate
from the Soviet Children’s Fund stressed educating young [my emphasis] women about
family and motherhood.164 Another, more pointed article stated,
“According to the Ministry of Health, 95 percent of these orphans’ parents
are alive [my emphasis]. 71 percent of orphans are born to young, single
women...Apart from the strictly moral argument, we must recognize that
girls ages 15 to 19 cannot afford to have children. Let us encourage our
young girls to avoid sexual temptations and wait until they are married and
stable, so that their children may avoid falling into a vicious cycle.”165
The correspondent’s concern about repeating a “vicious cycle” reveals the extent to
which teen pregnancy came to be seen as a detrimental phenomenon. Ultimately, the
threat of teen pregnancy transformed what may otherwise be explained as a harmless
teenage phase in a harmful phenomenon for future Soviet generations. Children raised
without a mother were seen as far less likely to fit the Soviet ideal of patriotic, productive
citizens. Journalists, then, expressed anxieties about young women’s abilities to
compromise an entire Soviet generation with early pregnancies.
Journalists argued there was an inextricable link between youth culture and sex,
and films like Tragedy Rock-Style and Little Vera bolstered their statements. Thus, the
print media also reported on the possibility for enhanced “sex education,” which provided
for arguably the most liberal sex discourse of the glasnost-era. Yet even as
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correspondents entertained the notion of expanding sex education to encompass the
realities of teens’ sexual behaviors, their discourses remained fundamentally conservative
as they focused once more on the ultimate goal, marriage and family. An article
published in Argumenty i fakty in February 1987 espoused the need to educate the youth
on sex. “Every young person should have knowledge of hygiene and a healthy lifestyle.
There is plenty of sex in the west, and yet the west does not educate people about it. Their
ruling class utilizes sex as a tool to isolate and distract the public from the problems at
hand...A socialist society does not have such individualist moral permissiveness.”166
While the correspondent advocated for a limited expansion of “sexual hygiene,” he did so
within a moralist context. Rather than taking the restrictive approach, some journalists
leaned toward expanding young people’s informational standard. Ultimately, however,
the goal was not the sexual emancipation of the public. Rather, journalists argued that
curing sexual ignorance would embolden young people against the lure of hedonism, and
would lead them toward a path free of “individualist moral permissiveness.”
Another article, published in 1991, echoed this sentiment in response to a 15-yearold’s question about masturbation. “It’s about time we cleared up these myths about the
harmful nature of masturbation. Science long ago proved that there are no harmful effects
to this natural practice. If we are to nurture a generation with strong marriage and family
values, we must accept the reality of people’s sexual natures.”167 Such calls to expunge
myths about sex also favored expanding young people’s base of knowledge, rather than
promoting wholesome restriction of any nonprocreative sexual activity. However, they
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did so with a sense of resignation, or an attitude of, “If you can’t beat them, join them.”
In “joining them,” the ultimate goal was to retake control of young people’s sexual
behaviors, and in a roundabout way, lead them back to love, marriage, and family.
Thus, seemingly opposing discourses from those against and those for expanding
sex education proved to be more united than they at first appear. These new discussions
of sex education elicited strong restrictive responses. Historian James Riordan quotes a
reader’s response to a “mildly” educational column about sex in the youth paper
Moskovskii komsomolets, “People old enough already know or can find out for
themselves...We knew nothing about ‘sex’ or ‘erotica’ before, but we still produced
healthy children...We had real love, a sense of duty, love for our mothers, our country,
patriotism, and so on.”168 This statement condemns sex education taught to teenagers, and
yet, such denouncements were not so different from calls for sex education. They were
both impassioned responses to a crisis of youth sexuality, which called for drastic and
unorthodox actions, such as the expansion of sex education. The letter-writer’s statement
about “real love,” and a “sense of duty,” reflected the stated goals of sex education
proponents. These goals were fairly conservative in nature, and did not call for the
disposal or even the relaxation of the old model of duty-bound, morally wholesome sex.
The moral crisis surrounding youth culture, moreover, was overwhelmingly
targeted at young women. According to Attwood, there was considerable media attention
focused on teenage girls during the perestroika period as they headed into their childbearing years.169 There were also clinical studies conducted that suggested that girls and
women were less capable of making morally sound choices under stress. One such study
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conducted in the 1980s by sociologists L.S. Sapozhnikova found that teen girls had a
greater tendency to defer to males in morally challenging situations, and were generally
less likely to be “guided by moral principles.”170 Such studies reinforce the conclusion
that the popular press generally treated girls as the weakest link in Soviet society, and
explains why girls in youth subcultures received disproportionate attention in the print
media.
Men as Hostages of Female Sexuality?
Although the vast majority of popular press sex discourses in the transitional
period focused on women, there are traces within the texts that reflect the period’s “crisis
of masculinity.” Recognizing and examining the crisis of masculinity in the popular press
uncovers a more complete picture of the degree and nature of journalists’ social and
moral anxieties. A December 1990 issue of Krokodil features a full spread of cartoons,
depicting the pervasive role of sex in everyday life.171 A ubiquitous theme in such comics
is men’s distraction from everyday professional and martial duties. Two cartoons
included a wife coming home to find her husband with a nude woman (or women), while
another featured a wife and husband arguing about nudity on television while their son
sits by and watches. A third portrayed a man daydreaming about pornographic magazines
instead of focusing on a Party meeting. Cartoons of this nature suggested that men were
ultimately powerless to control their sexual urges. More fundamentally, however, they
hinted at men’s vulnerability in the face of women’s transparent sexuality. They
bemoaned women’s explicit sexuality as a harmful phenomenon not only for stability in
the domestic sphere, but also for men in their personal and professional lives. Women
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were ultimately imbued with the power to derail men in their most fundamentally
masculine endeavors: Party and professional life. Additionally, men’s moral integrity was
placed into crisis, as men found themselves unable to resist sexual enticement. Popular
press discourses, then, exposed journalistic fears about the feeble-minded Soviet male,
unable to resist sexual lures. Furthermore, they suggested that women’s sexuality had the
power to jeopardize economic and political stability in society.
The primary anxiety about male sexuality in the glasnost popular press related to
the integrity of an already endangered masculine identity, then further subjected to
degradation thanks to explicit depictions of female sexuality both in erotica and in
pornography. As in film, the popular press implicitly entertained the debate about how to
once again restore masculine identity to its revolutionary potential. According to
Goldschmidt, the primary cultural concern revolved around the muzhik, the archetype of
an artful and immoral male who fails to live up to masculine standards, and who “finds a
way to entertain himself with smut and scandal.”172 To a certain extent, men found
themselves in a public double bind in regards to reacting to an onslaught of sexually
explicit material. Unable to attain the ideal of Soviet masculinity through fulfillment of
professional goals thanks to the abysmal economic climate of the perestroika years, men
sought to ameliorate the crisis of masculinity by exercising “compensatory
masculinity.”173 This macho image required men to ostensibly display abundant virility.
Thus, men could not completely denounce pornographic images without forfeiting this
last expression of masculinity.
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Journalists who passionately vilified pornography and prostitution also subtly
acknowledged its irrefutable draw for men. “I felt dirty the whole time I was covering
this story,” reported a correspondent who profiled urban prostitutes for a 1987 issue of
Krokodil, “I showered three times a day...I began to notice that I was having negative
[sexual] thoughts about every young woman I saw on the streets.”174 A 1989 article in
Sovetskaia kul'tura about explicit sex in cinema fretted, “Our correspondent in
Ordzhonikidze was afraid [my emphasis] to finish watching the films for this report
because he feared seeing blatant sex acts.”175 Articles like these openly expressed angst
about the power of sexual imagery on men, whose compensatory masculinity required a
carnal response to the naked female form. Moreover, these implicit statements imbued
sexually “emancipated” women with a degree of power over men, elevating female
prostitutes and porn stars to the dreaded status of succubi.
Journalists’ conclusions that women’s preoccupation with sex degraded the
domestic sphere appear to be a logical deduction, since women were traditionally tasked
with both the physical and the moral upkeep of the home and family. Yet journalistic
anxieties about women’s sexuality came full circle in discourses about how pornography
and prostitution distracted men from professional and political obligations. In essence,
journalists regurgitated the concerns Lenin expressed about “free love” in the 1920s, that
preoccupation with sex diverted men from their revolutionary pursuits. However, a more
complex, and uniquely glasnost-era fear also emanated from the discourse of this period:
that men’s newfound obsession with pornography and prostitutes was drawing them
further into compensatory masculinity and farther from the traditional, hegemonic
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paradigm. A correspondent for Izvestiia reported in May 1990 on his experiences
interviewing men who were waiting in line to buy pornography in metro kiosks. “They
were like zombies…They thought nothing of wasting an hour in line, losing their sense of
purpose and themselves.”176 The anxieties about women’s sexuality, then, transcended
the domestic and familial arena and permeated economic and political contexts, by
threatening men’s sociopolitical priorities.
Conclusion
Journalistic discourse on sex in the glasnost era can be more fully contextualized
as part of a conservative, “profamily” trend among intellectuals. Reactionary discourse
about women was one of the products of social, political, and economic instability during
the perestroika era. Journalists considered the state of the Soviet gender hierarchy from
many angles during the glasnost period, hoping that within gender would lie a remedy for
their anxieties. One of the most frequent questions was about women in their capacities
as mothers. After an ostensible spike in youth violence and crime, journalists questioned
women’s abilities to bear the double burden of professional and familial responsibility.
An Argumenty i fakty correspondent questioned Secretary Galina Suhorochenkova of the
Trade Unions of the Soviet Union about the needs of working mothers. Ultimately, both
the correspondent and Secretary Suhorochenkova tended to agree that, to some extent,
professional obligation interfered with women’s domestic duties and with the moral
upbringing of the next Soviet generation.
Correspondent N. Akritova: “Gorbachev has claimed that women’s
rightful place is in the home, raising our future generations. People seem
to agree with this statement. How then can we help working women?”
Secretary Suhorocehnkova: “We need to expand women’s access to parttime hours, and get them away from the strenuous, long work conditions
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which might ultimately damage their health, and which definitely impede
their ability to have children and to raise them morally.”177
Secretary Suhorocehnkova’s statement represents a reactionary step because it suggested
that women’s reproductive sexuality was more important than women’s labor in the
perestroika period.
In addition to the more obviously “profamily” discourse, such as the erstwhile
article, journalists expressed their conservatism by highlighting nonreproductive sex and
its potentially negative implications. The use of sex as a discursive proxy was a novel
technique, made possible by glasnost. Examining journalistic discourse on sex suggests
that the dominant trend in the glasnost print media was the continuation of previously
restrictive principles. Public debate over sex, especially in regards to women, did not
signify that the intelligentsia’s attitude about sexuality in social and moral contexts had
become notably more permissive. Moreover, the nature of sex discourse suggests that
journalists retained a significant degree of conservatism during glasnost in the absence
(or reduction) of top-down coercion.
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EPILOGUE – A POST-SOVIET PARADOX
The idiom “parade of horribles” originates from parades of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries in the United States and Europe, which featured participants
wearing comic and grotesque costumes and scaring parade goers. However, as a
rhetorical device it refers to showcasing a list of extremely undesirable events that will
supposedly result from a preliminary action or phenomenon. The idiom is classified
under “appeal to emotion” in any logician’s handbook. In the case of glasnost-era
discourses on sex and sexuality, filmmakers and journalists employed this hyperbolic
method to full effect. Glasnost provided intellectuals a new discursive proxy, which they
utilized in order to express both anxieties about the state of social and moral affairs in the
perestroika period, and to offer prophetic visions of a world consumed by sex.
It is ironic, then, that in the two and a half decades following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, sex has become a mainstay in all things cultural and journalistic in Russia.
In 1989, a periodical titled SPID-info (AIDS Info) came into print, aimed originally at
combatting Soviet ignorance regarding sexually transmitted diseases.178 However, these
prophylactic goals were steadily replaced with nude images of women, lifestyle and sex
advice, as well as tabloid coverage of Russian and international celebrities. By 1994,
SPID-info had the highest subscription rate of any periodical in Russia.179 In that same
year, the editorial board voted to add a masthead to the cover page of Spid-info, reading
“SPEED” in Latin letters. The transformation of Spid-info, from defender of Soviets’
health and wellbeing to soft pornography with no social mission, widely reflects the
arguments of many glasnost-era intellectuals who used sex as a discursive proxy, that the
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Soviet public “could not handle erotic culture.”180 The periodical’s metamorphosis
further illustrates intellectuals’ anxieties about the abundance of newly transparent
sexuality, which began in the glasnost years; Spid-info’s focus has shifted from collective
good to individual hedonism, with no obvious moral qualms from the editors. The name
change, too, is a meaningful expression: “SPEED” represents a desire for instant
gratification, a veritable denouncement of Soviet ideology. Likewise, the use of bold,
capitalized Latin letters signifies the adoption of a sexually permissiveness that
intellectuals would characterize as unequivocally western.

Figure 3. The March 2011 issue of Spid-info. The article on the right is titled, “Husband sends me
off to stripper courses.”

But, sex as a theme has not been confined to intentionally seamy publications like
Spid-info, and has extended into every conceivable aspect of Soviet life. Women made
light of being “gold diggers,” a newly acceptable term in post-Soviet Russia, referring to
women who sought men primarily for their wealth. Beauty contests, which featured a
particularly risqué bikini portion, became prominent. The winners frequently, and
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unabashedly, made it known that they were looking for an eligible, and very wealthy
suitor. Women also competed to procure a rich husband from the “New Russian” stock,
men who had made their fortune during the Soviet collapse.181 For those who lacked the
luck or physical assets to draw one of these rare entrepreneurs, there was another
opportunity: the infamous world of “mail-order brides,” which became an ever more
popular trend with the internet explosion of the late 1990s. This option allowed Russian
women the opportunity to escape the widespread poverty of the post-Soviet period. It also
encapsulated the anxieties present in Intergirl on a massive, coordinated scale. Ironically
enough, the moralizing intelligentsia of the glasnost era, who denounced a proliferation
of sexually explicit material, may not have imagined such trends in their worst
nightmares.
Sex has also become a mainstay in television, popularly thought to be beyond
reproach. During the late Soviet era, television was a vital ideological apparatus of the
state. A handful of channels screened Party ideologues’ speeches at intermittent intervals,
ideological cartoons for children, and documentaries following upstanding Soviet
citizens. While some programs were imported from the west during the glasnost period,
there was hardly a trace of sex or sexuality in Soviet television. Television’s role as a
predominantly state-controlled medium remains a characteristic of post-Soviet Russia.
Recognizing television’s potential as an ideological engine, President Putin seized control
of several independent channels in 2000, bringing them once again under state control.182

181

Engel, Women in Russia, 263.
Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New
Russia (New York: Public Affairs, 2014), 6.
182

90

Yet in a post-Soviet television milieu that continues to be primarily state-controlled, sex
has become an omnipresent phenomenon.
Journalist Peter Pomerantsev describes how the “gold digger” phenomenon has
infiltrated Russian television in the 2000s, drawing on experience working on his first
television production job in Russia. He chronicles his involvement in producing a
program called How to Marry a Millionaire (A Gold Digger’s Guide), a reality show
following the Gold Digger Academy in Moscow, a course teaching women how to utilize
their sexuality to hook a wealthy man, as either for a husband or a lover.183 According to
Pomerantsev, there are dozens of such “academies” in Moscow and St. Petersburg, with
names like “Geisha School” or “How to Be a Real Woman.”184 The message behind
shows like these is quite unambiguous: a woman’s sexuality is her greatest asset. This
idea has steadily expanded into various television programs, even in seemingly
nonsensical ways. In 2000, a television show called The Naked Truth aired on a major
channel, and featured an attractive young woman undressing as she delivered the latest
news.185 Engel contextualizes this phenomenon by noting, “In a highly competitive
market, where funds were scarce and the rate of failure high, seasoning a product with
women’s sexuality boosted sales.”186 It would seem, then, that post-Soviet Russians have
embraced the concept of “sex sells.”
Cinema has also felt the pull of a newly competitive market, as filmmakers battle
for Russian viewership against domestic and foreign opponents, as well as the expanded
realm of television. According to Faraday, Russian viewers lost their appetite for “the
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discourses of sobriety,” and the chernukha film cycle faded out by the end of 1991.187 He
further argues that post-Soviet filmmakers did not lose their proclivity for creating films
with moral and ideological messages, despite their move away from highlighting social
problems.188 Yet filmmakers recognize that their productions must fit certain criteria to
preform successfully in a post-Soviet film industry that only recently began its recovery
from the economic crises of the 1990s. Faraday notes, “the post-perestroika period
produced films that fell under the category of messianic populist, in that they offered
audiences a moral message in popularly accessible form.”189 It is difficult to say without
further analysis which tendency, moral or commercial, currently dominates the
contemporary Russian cinematic milieu.
Post-Soviet Russian cinema has tended to depict life as generally light-hearted
and fun, or as Pomerantsev notes, “rosy.” While aspects of Russian life, such as career
and family life, have been portrayed in more buoyant ways in post-Soviet cinema, sex,
however, has largely remained characterized by aggressive misogyny. 190 According to
Engel, “No film appeared [in the post-Soviet period] without at least one graphic,
frequently brutal and sadistic, sexual encounter, sometimes entirely unrelated to the
plot.”191 The violent sexuality in contemporary Russian film reflects more than the
fulfillment of criteria in the production of a commercially viable film, but as Borenstein
argues, the continuation of implicit aggression towards the metaphorical “Motherland,”
which has ostensibly failed to make good on perestroika-era promises.192
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The question, then, is: what is the social and moral context of this seemingly
unrestrained sexual permissiveness in culture and the popular press? Pomerantsev argues
that cultural producers of Russia’s twenty-first century can no longer be classified as the
intelligentsia class, which has been steadily replaced by aggressive capitalists, searching
for the perfect profit formula.193 They have adopted the concept of “sex sells,” first
popularized in the west. Yet economic motives do not fully account for the continued
proliferation of sexual imagery, especially violent and sexist depictions, in contemporary
Russian culture. Feminism continues to be a dirty word in Russia, gender roles are still
largely viewed as binary and innate, and the concept of the heterosexual-procreative
family is buttressed rather than challenged.194 Sociologist Elena Omelchenko concludes
that young people, the “children of perestroika,” are generally in favor of state regulation
in regards to what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate sexuality, citing “protecting
the family structure” as their primary concern.195 This data is reinforced with the
establishment of several “profamily” measures since 2006, mostly targeted at limiting the
collective power and visual presence of LGBT Russians. Thus, like in the glasnost
period, the proliferation of explicit sexual material has not generally aligned with the
stated moral values of many Russians, both private citizens and members of the
governing body.
This contemporary situation constitutes a paradox: legal norms and public opinion
grow more conservative while the cultural media perpetuates explicit sexual imagery.
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Women are ostensibly given robust sexual agency within the “gold digger” trope, and yet
public opinion and “profamily” legislation would suggest that many Russians continue to
view women’s appropriate path as one towards marriage and family. It is important to
keep in mind, however, that while women’s sexuality has been allowed more public
visibility, sexual visibility does not necessarily mean that the definition of normative
sexuality has expanded in post-Soviet Russia. The “gold digger” utilizes her sexuality
towards the goal of securing a wealthy husband, for the purpose of acting as wife and
mother to children. In this instance, perhaps, the ends justify the means. Ultimately, the
link between women’s sexuality and family remains unbroken from the glasnost era to
the post-Soviet years: women’s sexuality is acceptable insofar as it eventually leads to
marriage and children.
The concept of the virile Russian man, however, has definitely gained traction in
the post-Soviet period. According to Engel, the newly established market has provided
men an ostensible means in which to redeem their masculinity after a perceived period of
crisis.196 It rewards such traits as aggression and competitiveness. President Putin is well
known in Russia and the west as the encapsulation of this new masculine paradigm.197
The rehabilitated Russian man is also sexually dominant, seen as retaking his innate
control at the top of the gender hierarchy, and possibly even punishing women for their
perceived transgressions during the Soviet period. Sexual violence towards women in
Russian culture, can then, in part, be analyzed within the dynamic gender constructions of
the post-Soviet period.
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It is impossible, however, to make conclusive statements about the social,
political, and moral contexts of contemporary Russian discourses on sex without a
rigorous scholarly analysis. Within such a study, as in this one, it is necessary to establish
the identity of the cultural producers and journalist who generate these discourses.
Although the social, political, and economic changes of the last quarter century have
painted a convoluted picture of who produces discourses on sex and what their explicit
and implicit motivations may be, scholars should continue to be wary of associating
visible sexuality with egalitarianism.
The erstwhile examination of filmmakers’ and journalists’ discourses on sex
during the glasnost period provides one such example of a time and place where the
widespread circulation of sexual discourse cannot reasonably be associated with sexual
liberalism or gender egalitarianism. The misleading portrait of sexual progressivism in
the glasnost era, which superficially masked intellectuals’ enduring notions of sexuality
as primarily associated with procreation, proved to be the latest chapter in Soviets’
problematic history of conceptualizing human sexuality. Intellectuals’ discourses on sex
in the perestroika period reflect a wider sense of social, moral, and political disharmony,
not a fundamental reevaluation of sex’s role in Soviet society. Sex appears regularly in
cinema and the popular press in the glasnost period, and yet the presence of this
previously forbidden theme does not reflect a major change in how intellectuals
conceptualized sex and sexuality. Filmmakers and journalists ascribed sexuality a
“negative” connotation, linking it to familial instability and moral decay. Moreover, the
disproportionally destructive weight women’s sexualities carried in glasnost-era film and
news media suggests that intellectuals did not implicitly or explicitly extend gender
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equality to the sexual realm. Ultimately, sexuality, especially women’s sexuality, was
assigned the role of preliminary phenomenon in a Soviet parade of horribles, one which
was purported to conclude with social, political, and moral anarchy.
An analysis of discourses on sex in contemporary Russian society would also
require an evaluation of the extent of interconnectedness between the state and the
producers of discourse. It will be necessary to establish to what degree, if at all, the
producers of discourse in the twenty-first century directly represent the state. Even in
post-Soviet Russia, and especially in western journalism, the state is frequently deemed
to be interchangeable with nongovernmental bodies. It would be a mistake to neglect the
sociopolitical autonomy of modern filmmakers, journalists, and television producers, and
to assume that contemporary Russia is a totalitarian state. With that said, evaluating the
extent of interconnectedness between discourse producers and the state in Russia’s
twenty-first century may yield interesting results, considering the state’s renewed
involvement in journalism and television, with the establishment of state-controlled news
sources like Russia Today and NTV (National Television).
Challenging the notion of the Soviet totalitarian state has been an overarching
theme of the preceding chapters as well. The state had varying degrees of power over
journalistic and film discourses at different periods in Soviet history. In the last years of
the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s glasnost reforms created the comparatively highest levels
of autonomy among cultural producers. In fact, the Soviet Union was flooded with
hardcore pornographic materials, both foreign and domestic, by the beginning of the
1990s. Soviet officials never established a comprehensive system of censorship to
regulate pornography to replace the previous catch-all system. Intellectuals, filmmakers
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and journalists, also utilized sex in their productions. However, they expressed
conservatism by using sex and sexuality as a discursive proxy to bemoan the perceived
damages of supposed sexual permissiveness. They did so without the prompting of any
official bodies, in part as a fulfillment of their unofficial yet obligatory roles as moral
vanguards. Thus, this study contributes to a growing series of scholarship in the twentyfirst century that challenges the notion of autocracy in Soviet Russia at various points in
its history, and aims to reveal a more nuanced understanding of Soviet’s social, moral,
and political concerns in the glasnost period.
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